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Brazil makes progress at night, when the
politicians are sleeping.
—POPULAR SAYING
WE BEGIN THIS PAPER with a summary of the first four centuries of
Brazilian economic history. During this period there were booms in
certain agricultural and extractive products, but until the advent of
coffee they failed to lead to permanent and sustained general economic
development. We then turn to a review of the modern (post-1900)
period, in which the state of São Paulo became Brazil's dynamic center
of economic development, with a preeminence that was initially agri-
cultural and later industrial-urban as well. We then arrive at the heart
of our analysis, an original piece of research on the interrelationships
between industrial-urban development and agriculture during the decade
1940—50, the most recent period for which the necessary detailed basic
data as yet exist. We conclude with an appraisal of Brazilian public
policy since 1950, with particular reference to its effects on the agri-
cultural sector and the achievement of an integrated national economy.
0T
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THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES:
BOOMS AND RETROGRESSIONS
The discovery of Brazil at the turn of the sixteenth century, began an
era during which the eastern coast was regularly visited by various
f
expeditions of the Portuguese and other Europeans. The initial attrac-
tion was Brazil wood, from which the new colony derived its name.
e
This wood was the source of a much valued red dye. Foreign competition
soon forced Portugal to consider the establishment of permanent settle-
ments to assure its possession of this new land. In 1534—36 the Crown
created fourteen hereditary "captaincies" (capitanias). These adminis-
trative divisions, of which there were ultimately eighteen, were of varying
width and continued to the country's then western limits. While many
of these capitanias languished or progressed very slowly, that of Pernam-
buco (or New Lusitania) flourished from the outset, thanks toits
effective leadership, its greater proximity to Europe, and the rapidity with
which the fabulously profitable culture of sugar-cane was established.
e
The Sugar Boom, 1530—1700
I
Radiatingfrom Pernambuco's first settlements, the towns of Igaracu
(1536) and Olinda (1537), cane production had by 1600 spread along
the entire coast from Salvador (1549) to Natal (1599). The success of
this first great European colonial enterprise based on agriculture rather
than on precious metals or other extracted products was due, writes 9
Furtado,to a very favorable conjunction of circumstances—the still 9
largelyunsatiated demand for sugar in Europe; the relatively advanced
techniques that the Portuguese had already developed in cane pro- 9
ductionin their Atlantic islands and in sugar-making equipment; the 14
merchandising and financial role of the Low-Country merchants (espe-
cially the Dutch) who acquired the raw sugar in Lisbon, carried it to
Antwerp or Amsterdam for refining, thence distributed it through all of a
Western Europe, while financing an increasing share of the expansion
of productive capacity in Brazil; and the command that the Portuguese
had established over the African slave markets, thereby enabling them
to solve the severe manpower shortage in the new colony.'
1InstitutoBrasileiro de Geografia e EstatIstica (l.B.G.E.), Conseiho Nacional r4
de Geografla, Geografia do Brasi!, Vol. III, Rio de Janeiro, 1962, Pp. 156—57;
Hélio Vianna, Histdria do Bran!, Vol. I, São Paulo, 1963 (2nd ed.), pp. 86—89, tlt
69—73, and 118—127; and Celso Furtado, Forrnacdo Econômica do Brasil, 2nd ed., 10kThe Case of Brazil 313
Unfortunately, this very favorable situation was adversely affected
by the union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580. By this
union, which lasted seventy years, the enemies of Spain became the
enemies of Portugal as well, and the Brazilian colony was harassed by
the British, French, and especially the Dutch. Most important was the
a Dutch invasion and successful occupation of the entire northeast coast
a from Sergipe to Natal and Fortaleza during 1630—54. Only the colonial
capital of Salvador escaped their prolonged control. The principal
economic consequence of this incursion was the establishment by the
ii Dutch of a competitive sugar industry in the Caribbean. While in Brazil,
they had made good use of the opportunity to familiarize themselves
a with the technical and organizational aspects of sugar production.
Thanks to this competition, sugar prices were permanently halved and
g the volume of Brazilian sugar exports halved as well. Thus, by 1700-S-—
y Brazil—with a total colonial population of perhaps 300,000 (100,000
Europeans)—and Portugal were undergoing a serious economic con-
5 traction.2
h During its century or more of rapid expansion prior to 1650, how-
l, ever, the Brazilian sugar industry had given the first impetus to settle-
ment of the interior. During this period, virtually all of the land suitable
for cane in the littoral of Pernambuco (including modern Alagoas) and
Bahia had been incorporated into this increasingly specialized industry.
U Yet the colonists and their slaves faced a growing need not only for
food crops and meat, but also for the oxen, lumber, and firewood so
essential to the production and processing of cane. Initially, the peren-
nial lower reaches of the local rivers had not only served the trans-
u portation needs of the sugar industry, but also gave access to coastal
d lands that could provide food and production goods of agricultural
origin. However, it was soon recognized that the use of the scarce cane
e lands for these secondary activities as well was uneconomic, the Portu-
guese Crown finally going so far as to prohibit cattle production in the
0 Rio de Janeiro, 1961, PP. 18—22. In the latter remarkable book, Furtado has
estimated that, in1600, the per capita income of the Brazilian population of
European origin (constituting 30,000 of a total of 100,000 people) was U.S.
e $350—much higher than that then prevailing in Europe and not again achieved
in Brazil until modern times—and that the profits of the Brazilian sugar industry
fl were sufficient to finance a doubling of its productive capacity every two years
(ibid.,pp.58, 60, 91).
2Furtado,op. cii., pp. 27—29. While seriously damaging the economy of the
relatively long.settled Brazilian colony, the rapid growth of the sugar industry in
7; theCaribbean gave great impetus to the growth of the North American colonies
through the development of a triangular trade with the Antilles and Europe,
increasingly transported in New England bottoms (ibid., pp. 39—43).314 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
sugar zone. With an almost inexhaustible supply of land to the west, it
was only natural that this economic need should be met by settlement
of the interior. As such economic incentives began to wane with the
contraction of the sugar industry, the political need for improved land
communications between Salvador and Recife and the tenuously held
northern colonies became more apparent as a result of the long struggle
against the incursions of the several European powers. Thus the spread
of cattle raising into the interior was encouraged for different reasons
at different times. Settlement was fostered by the award of sesmarias
of land to new settlers.3
Meanwhile, the interiors of Ceará and Maranhão to the north had
been explored and settled during the seventeenth century, with Salvador
and Recife serving as the principal nuclei from which these pioneering
• activities originated. These bold new penetrations appealed most to
colonists without financial resources, who saw in cattle raising an
opportunity for a relatively rapid accumulation of wealth from a small
initial investment. Cattle are self-reproducing and require a minimal
labor force, which the indigenous population could easily and willingly
provide. Among these colonists were not only the less privileged immi-
grants to the sugar capitals of Recife and Salvador, but also, and more
important, the vicentinos from São Vicente (near present-day Santos
and São Paulo), whose lack of remunerative export products and
isolation from the mainstream of colonial Brazil had already made of
them hardy and restless explorers of the most remote corners of the new
land. While the baianos and vicentinos were settling the interior of
Bahia, the north of Minas Gerais, and the more remote interior of
Ceará, PiauI, and Maranhão—and putting down the strongly hostile
Indian tribes in the process—the pernambucanos were active to the
north and west of Recife. Besides blazing trails within this comparatively
restricted area, they also showed particular interest in the neighboring
areas of Paralba, Rio Grande de Norte, and northeastern Ceará. Some-
what less rapidly and thoroughly, they penetrated the sertão (interior)
of Pernambuco as far as the São Francisco River. By 1711, a contem-
porary observer reported more than 500 corrals and 800,000 head of
cattle in Pernambuco and its dependencies.4
While the human population in the arid sertão remained sparse, the
advent of cattle herds in the interior led to the establishment of trails
for driving cattle and conducting tropas of burros. These trails ultimately
4
Geografiado Brasil, III, pp. 156—57, 162; Furtado, pp. 70, 73.
Furtado, p. 75; Vianna, op. cit., pp. 228—31.
I
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it converged on Recife or Salvador. At places in the interior where they
crossed or merged, usually where there were suitable resting, feeding,
and watering grounds, small settlements developed, many of which grew
into important cattle markets as well. Juàzeiro in Bahia and Petrolina,
Salgueiro, and Arcoverde in Pernambuco are good examples within the
le sertão. More favored, however, were the settlements in the less arid
intermediate zones between the sertão and the coastal sugar belt. Among
is these were Feira de Santana in Bahia and the major market towns of
is the agreste—particularly Campina Grande (Paralba) and later Caruaru,
some 100 miles from the coast. Upon such centers converged not only
the cattle, dried beef, hides and leather from the sertão, but also, such
• surpluses of staple foods as the sugar zone could absorb. Because its
•ig climate was less arid than the sertão, the agreste itself was the main
•:o source of the staple food crops. Unfortunately, the initial impetus that
n the sugar boom had given to such development in the agreste and sertdo
11 had been markedly reduced during 1650—1700. The result was that
•a! the cattle industry increasingly took on a life of its own, moving to-
ly wardself-sufficiency and economic isolation—with meat providing the
i- principal food, and leather the basic raw material for clothing and most
other subsistence needs. This was bound to happen in the more remote
interior, far from the colonial population centers. But commercialization
of the agriculture even of the agreste and closer sertdo (up to 200 miles
from the sea) slowed down greatly and even retrogressed as the sugar
W industrymoved into a phase of economic stagnation and contraction
)f after
The Gold Boom of the Eighteenth Century
By 1700, Portugal and its Brazilian colony were in desperate economic
.g straits. The value of the Portuguese monetary unit in terms of pounds
sterling was one-third of what it had been in 1640. Hence, the discovery
•
•) ofgold in Minas Gerais (then in the capitania of São Paulo) at the
1- turnof the new century was a godsend that quickly changed the face
of the American colony. In the ensuing gold rush the long poor and
isolated southern colonists moved en masse to Minas, and much of the
redundant slave population of the northeast sugar zone was shifted to
Is the gold fields. The first major spontaneous immigration of Portuguese
of limited resources also got underway. Some idea of the importance of
this immigration is conveyed by the estimates of Furtado, according to
Vianna, pp. 228—3 1; Furtado, pp. 75—76,80—81,86.
•••T
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which, in the eighteenth century it totaled 300,000, while the European
population increased about ten-fold to perhaps 1,000,000 out of a total
of 3,250,000. Unlike the silver mines of Peru and Mexico, the mines of
Minas were small-scale and required little capital investment, nor did
the slave population ever outnumber the free. As a result, the attractions
for men of little or no financial resources were great. The gold rush also
created an enormous new demand for food, cattle, and beasts of burden,
a demand that far exceeded anything that prevailed during the most
prosperous years of the sugar industry. In the northeast, the driving of
cattle to the south caused a rapid rise in beef prices, provoking official
protests by the sugar interests. But the major beneficiaries of this new
market were in the south, whose old but rudimentary livestock industry
became extremely profitable for the first time. Central Brazil, São Paulo,
and Rio Grande do Sul were revitalized by the burgeoning demand for
beef cattle, horses, and mules, while the development of food crops was
greatly stimulated in the southern part of Minas (from 1720, an inde-
pendent capitania), São Paulo's Paralba Valley, and the State of Rio de
Janeiro (to which sugar-cane production had already been shifting)
By1800, the richer and more accessible gold deposits had been
virtually exhausted, but the gold boom had exacted a severe toll on the
northeast. In particular, the economic and political power that Pemam-
buco and Bahia had long enjoyed, was greatly reduced. The shift of
the colonial capital from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro in 1763 reflected
the southward shift of Brazil's socio-economic center of gravity. To be
sure, the Crown did not completely neglect the northeast. A royally
chartered trading company (1755—78), created to stimulate the develop-
ment of Maranhäo and PiauI, proved to be highly successful, while a
second trading company (1761—81) concerned with Pernambuco and
Paralba promoted with considerable success the production of tobacco
and cotton and the rehabilitation of the sugar industry. In great measure
• because of these promotional activities, the northeast was in a position
to respond positively to a series of favorable political events: the Amer-
ican Wars of Independence and of 1812 which disrupted England's
normal sources of supply of cotton, rice, and tobacco; the French
Revolution, whose reflexes in the slave revolt in Haiti brought a new
stage of prosperity for the Brazilian sugar industry; and the Napoleonic
Wars, which brought the Portuguese royal family to Brazil (1 808) and
opened its ports to all friendly nations. As a result, during the last
decades before independence (1780—1822), when the south was rapidly
3Furtado,pp.86,89—94.
'IrT
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retrogressing to a subsistence economy following the collapse of the gold
boom, the colony's agricultural exports nearly doubled.7
While this new period of prosperity in Pernambuco had a precarious
d base, it undoubtedly helped to stimulate the renewed development of
LS thenearby agreste.Inthis less arid region, strategically located between
the humid littoral and the very arid sertão,severalimportant towns
developed between 1772 and 1811. Henceforth, the agresteandlittoral
4 wereto maintain some continuity in the growth of new urban nuclei,
particularly with the spread of cotton culture, while the sertãoregion
remained static. Even this sparse population, however, proved to be
excessive during the calamitous droughts that frequently ravaged the p
sertdo,oftendecimating both the human and animal inhabitants. Strik-
• ing on the average about two out of every six years, these secassetoff
• enormous migrations which often brought short-term profit as well as
rS long-term population growth to the agreste and other areas (such as the
Cariri Region) less severely affected. Otherwise, the prosperity of the
•.e agreste was ever more closely entwined with the economic progress of
6 thelittoral, although thanks toits rather broad base of subsistence
n agriculture, the inland region was somewhat less vulnerable to the
• vagaries of world commodity markets than was the sugar zone, with
its highly specialized export agriculture.8
d
Political and Economic Readjustment, 1800—50
y Brazil's declaration of independence in1 822, anticipating the constitu-
tional monarchy formalized in the constitution of 1824, did not meet
a the wishes of its republican opponents. Of these, the most politically
d important were in Pernambuco, whose governor sought to enlist the
o whole northeast in favor of a republican form of government during
the Revolution of 1824. This outbreak, like its abortive predecessor, the
fl Revolution of 1817, was successfuly repressed. But the republican
sentiment was a factor in the agitation that culminated in the abdication
'S in 1831 of Dom Pedro Tin favor of his infant son. In the process the
h real power passed to the dominant colonial landed class of the littoral.
While doctrinaire free-traders, this class was to come increasingly into
C conflict with the English, who had achieved by treaties in 1810 and
d 1827 extraterritorial rights and preferential tariffs in Brazil. Initially,
it the landed interests benefited. Because of the treaties, it was possible,
y
1Ibid.,pp. 102—04, 107—10; Vianna, pp. 311—16.
SGeografiado Brasil, III, pp. 166—67, 170—72.
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in the exportation of agricultural products, to bypass the onerous pel
entrepôt of Lisbon. At the same time, the treaties made imported goods c4
much cheaper and more abundant and credit facilities much ampler co(
than before. However, with the restoration of peace in Europe and North
America, the English gave renewed preference to the tropical products in
of their Caribbean colonies which, with the increasing suppression of a
the slave trade, looked upon Brazil's slave-produced sugar as unfair B
competition. English efforts to put an end to Brazilian slave imports E
were resented by the sugar interests and by tobacco producers as well, ti
since the slave trade promoted the exchange of Brazilian tobacco for F
slaves in African markets.9 ce
Furthermore, Brazilian producers of agricultural exports were again P
faced with competition in cotton, rice, tobacco, and even sugar-cane
from the Southern United States, whose production, likewise based on
slavery, was much more efficient. Because of these developments, the
northeast was hard hit by a steady fall in sugar prices and an even
sharper decline in cotton prices. Moreover, until the treaty with England
expired in 1844, the Brazilian government was powerless to finance
itself (and to discourage the high propensity to import) by raising import
duties. At the same time the landed interests were politically too strong Tlj.
to permit an export tax. The result was heavy deficit financing and the
rapid depreciation of the Brazilian monetary unit, with considerable
civil unrest especially in the urban areas where small merchants, public Bij
servants, and the military were hard hit. Thus, during the second quarter nd
of the nineteenth century, Brazil desperately needed to expand its th1
volume of exports, especially in the face of a 40 per cent decline in its Di
international terms of trade. Although the Brazilian sugar industry
(despite many problems) succeeded in doubling its quantum of exports,
the money value of those exports increased by only 24 per cent. Cotton
exports dropped 10 per cent in volume but 50 per cent in value and,
although exports of hides and skins doubled, their value fell by 12 per
cent. Little wonder that Furtado concluded that "In Bahia and in ag
Pernambuco, and even more in Maranhão, per capita income must have
declined substantially during this period." '° si4
The only hopeful development during 1822—50 was the gestation of
the coffee boom. Coffee had first been planted in the Amazonian state
of Path in 1727 and quickly spread as far south as Rio de Janeiro. Until
the Haitian revolt of 1789, however, it had been produced on a small
scale for largely domestic consumption. By 182 1—30, both sugar with 32
9Furtado, pp. 111—14.
1°Ibid., pp. 114—16, 126—27, 129—32.T
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per cent of the total value of Brazilian exports and cotton with 20 per
is cent still outranked coffee with 19 per cent. However, by 1841—50
coffee easily held first place with 41 per cent, while the shares of sugar
and cotton had fallen to 27 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively. In the
interim, coffee exports had expanded more than five-fold in quantum
and more than three-fold in value. Thanks to coffee, the real value of
ir Brazilian exports grew by 40 per cent in the second quarter-century.
Even so, Furtado estimated that in 1850, per capita of the free popula-
I tion, it was probably little more than 50 per cent of its 1800 level.
Furthermore the increasing rewards of coffee production were con-
centrated on the region centering on the state of Rio de Janeiro and the
Paralba Valley. In fact, this latter region, in the state of São Paulo, was
able to recoup its Loss of domestic markets following the collapse of
• the gold boom in Minas Gerais and to resume population growth."
Pernambuco and the northeast, on the other hand, largely escaped the
boom.
d
:e Coffee Becomes King, 1850—1900
rt
The second half of the nineteenth century saw a vast improvement in
the Brazilian economy as a whole but a further deterioration in the
economic position of Pernambuco and the northeast. By the 1890's
Brazil was producing about 60 per cent of the world's coffee. Coffee
now accounted for 64 per cent of Brazil's exports by value, and rubber,
thanks to the boom then well under way in Amazonia, for 16 per cent.
:s During the previous half-century, coffee exports had increased by 341
y per cent by quantum and 742 per cent by value, as compared with
214 and 358 per cent for all exports. (Taking into account a reduction
n of about 8 per cent in import prices in the interim, the gains in total
•1, value of exports become 809 per cent for coffee and 396 per cent for all
exports.) This spectacular development provided the basis for an aver-
fl agereal growth rate in the coffee region, estimated by Furtado at about
C 2.3per cent per capita between the 1840's and 1890's. This was a
sufficiently dynamic rate of development to reintegrate much of the
subsistence sector of central and southern agriculture into the national
•C economy; the per capita annual real growth rate of the extreme south
iI may have averaged one per cent.12
2 "Ibid., pp. 132—33, 128; Agricuizura em São Paulo, Vol. 8 (August 1961),
Table 1, p. 21; I.B.G.E., Conseiho Nacional de EstatIstica, Anudrio EstazIstico do
Brasil, 1958, Rio de Janeiro, 1958, p. 234.
'2Furtado,pp. 163—71.320 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
Because of very favorable developments in tobacco and cocoa
exports (the cocoa industry attracted a significant influx of people from al
the rest of the northeast) the state of Bahia probably brought its per te
capita exports during 1850—1900 up to the level of the rest of the north-
east, although in per capita real income it held its own at best. During
the same period, the rubber boom had outpaced even coffee develop-
ment. In the two decades following the 1870's rubber's share of exports
I s
by value grew from 5.5 to 15.8 per cent. For 1900—10 the average
was 27.9 per cent. During the period 1850—1900, the per capita annual d
growth rate of rubber-producing Amazonia was 6.2 per cent, despite ti
the absorption of 260,000 immigrants (followed by approximately the
same number during 1900—10), mostly from the northeast. As its
high outmigration rates would suggest, the northeastern region did not
share in this growing prosperity. During the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the quantum of Brazilian sugar exports had increased
by a further 33 per cent, but prices fell by 11 per cent. Cotton exports
(despite another brief period of precarious prosperity during the Amer- p
ican Civil War, which temporarily exploded cotton's share of total p
exports from 6 per cent in the 1850's to 18 per cent in the 1860's)
increased 43 per cent by volume and 89 per cent by value. In the
northeast, decimated by outmigration and disastrous drought, these
modest gains in terms of real income were insufficient to check the con-
tinued reduction (estimated by Furtado at 0.6 per cent per year) in
per capita income during
The sugar zone of the northeast was also strongly affected by the
abolition of slavery in 1888—a step that undermined the political power
of the old slaveholding class, even though the backlash of that power
was strong enough to oust the able and much loved Dom Pedro II from
his throne. In the northeast the economic consequences of emancipation
were relatively minor. For most of the freed slaves there was little access
to land in the subsistence sector of agriculture without long-distance mi-
gration. Most of the lands of the agreste and sertão had been taken up
and were already showing signs of demographic pressure. As a result,
virtually all of the freed slaves remained on the sugar plantations at low
wages, and there was no significant change in the organization of pro-
duction or the cost of labor. In the hinterland of Rio de Janeiro, where
a slave-based coffee industry had developed, most of the earlier coffee
landshad been nearly exhausted by the new crop. Because of their
familiarity with coffee production, the freed slaves could command higher
wages than their fellow emancipates in the sugar region. But rather than
13 Ibid.,pp. 15253, 16465, 168—69, 171. fe
-r
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migrate westward, most of them preferred to take advantage of the
abundance of unoccupied land in the hills and mountains of the Rio hin-
terland and withdrew into the subsistence economy.'4
1- At the time of abolition, while slaves still constituted most of the
g labor force in the monetized sector of Brazilian agriculture, a much
larger number of free men made up the vast subsistence sector. Their
Is subsistence plots were generally part of the extensive holdings of a major
landowner, whose principal commercial interest, if any, was cattle pro-
duction. With so much land capable of supporting a large tenant popula-
:e tion able to feed themselves with virtually no capital and the most rudi-
'
te mentary techniques, the large landholder's principal reward was not eco-
Is nomic but socio-political, with power and prestige proportioned, for
-)t example, to the number of votes or the degree of social obeisance he
could command. While this subsistence sector provided a great pooi of
d underemployed manpower whose productivity was very low, it was un-
able to satisfy the rapidly growing labor needs of the coffee region. In
part this was due to the strong resistance of the landed coroneis, to
public migration policy, and partly to the prevailing belief that the sub-
) sistence system lacked the work discipline essential to the large, well-
capitalized, and intricately organized coffee plantations. In the south,
the subsistence sector gradually adjusted its economic organization and
productivity in response to the increased incentives to commercialize its
output. In the northeast, there was little change, as the region was largely
bypassed by the wave of European (largely Italian) and Japanese immi-
grants attracted to the coffee region through active recruitment and heavy
public subsidies.'5
Brazil in 1900
11 Brazil's first four centuries (apart from the rise of coffee) may be epito-
mized by a term recently applied by George Dalton to twentieth-cen-
tury Liberia: "growth without development." With almost monotonous
1, 14Ibid.,pp. 159—62.
ibid.,pp. 140—43, 144—49. In support of Furtado, itis interesting to con-
sider trends inthe combined populations of thefivenortheasternstatesof
Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, and Alagoas and their
capital cities during 1872—1900—a period of heavy migration from the northeast
to the Bahia cocoa zone and Amazonia. During 1872—90, the population of the
ir five capitals declined 7 per cent while the remaining populations of these states
rose 25 per cent; during 1872—1900, the capitals gained 5 per cent and the re-
maining population of the states 40 per cent. These data suggest that, despite the
11 effects of the various droughts (especially that of 1877—79)in driving rural
people into the cities,such outmigration from the northeast as occurred af-
fected these and other urban centers much more than it did in the hinterlands.T
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regularity, some agricultural or extractive product—Brazil wood, sugar-
cane, gold, cotton, cocoa, rubber—flourished for a time and produced
enormous wealth, only to collapse with the exhaustion of the particular
resource or the rise of competition from other countries more technically
progressive and economically efficient. This economic pattern was ac-
companied by a speculative and exploitive spirit of "getting what you
can while the getting's good," a psychology that accounts for the peren-
nial failure to plow back even a small fraction of large current earnings
into the capital improvements and better techniques that might have
preserved the income base even within agriculture.
As in the southern United States, use of slave labor tended to favor a
static and routinized production system; agricultural prosperity based on
export markets fostered an agrarian outlook marked by contempt for
industrial-urban life and a willingness to accept indefinitely a depend-
ence on foreign industrial products. Compared to Brazil, however, the
U.S. South was a paragon of agricultural development. The Calvin-
istic ethic of work and thrift and the experimental and progressive spirit
that derived from the Age of Enlightenment in which the North Ameri-
can republic was born had left their mark on its plantation owners.
With their very different cultural roots, Brazil's men of agricultural
wealth preferred to preserve a European enclave on the South American
continent, favoring industrial goods of European origin, educating their
sons in Portugal, and spending much of their own lives abroad or in the
court life of the national capital. When the most propitious time for
capital formation in the agricultural lands under their control had passed,
they could still maintain a materially satisfactory level of "genteel pov-
erty," at which they could continue to enjoy socio-political prestige and
influence.
While the stewards of Brazilian agriculture were playing a passive
entrepreneurial role, in effect assuring that capital formation and tech-
nical advance in that sector would proceed at too slow a pace to prevent
ultimate retrogression, industrialization also languished. Manufacturing
of any kind was prohibited during colonial times by the mercantilistic
policies of the mother country and until 1844 industrial protection-
ism was effectively prevented by the privileged trade position officially
granted to England in 1810. The efforts made by Viscount Mauá during
1850—70 to diversify the Brazilian economy—through encouragement
of the food and textile industries and the development of railroads, ports,
and banks—met with only modest success and were viewed with scant
sympathy by the agrarian-based power structure. Although Mauá ac-
tively sought to check the growing power of the new coffee monoculture,fl
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- theimprovements in the infrastructure for which he was responsible had
the reverse effect. With the emancipation of the slaves and the subse-
r quent founding of the Republic (1889), the domestic agrarian political
base was substantially weakened. At the same time, Brazil fell into dis-
- favorwith England and France, its traditional economic partner and
cultural mentor, respectively. In search of an economic model, Brazil
- turnedfor the first time to the United States, and, impressed by the in-
creasingly protectionist and nationalistic policies of the Yankees, enacted
e in 1897 an ultraprotectionist tariff. In the first decade of the Republic
there were indications (largely in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) that
a industry was responding favorably to this policy. However, before the
decade was over, inflation, widespread speculation, and fraud in the
-r formation of new firms and banks had largely discredited domestic in-
•- dustrialdevelopment. Handicapped by the strong consumer preference
e for manufactures of foreign origin and the inclinations of the new coffee
tycoons toward the traditional "free-trade" philosophy, Brazilian indus-
trialization still faced a long uphill battle as the country entered the
twentieth century.'6
n THE NEW DYNAMISM:
•r THE RISE OF SAO PAULO, 1900-60
r The nucleus of Brazil's modern economic development, both agricul-
tural and industrial, has been the state of São Paulo. The ever-widening
- influenceof this state has spread to the rest of the south and central
west, with increasing repercussions even in the old, but long stagnant
and poor regions of the north and northeast. Hence, we must now turn
e our attention to this developmental nucleus whose fabulously large
agricultural surplus eventually became the basis of the general economic
••t development of Brazil. It is this development and particularly the emer-
•g gence of an industrial-urban complex that gives promise at last of serv-
c ing as the instrument for modernizing a still largely traditional and static
agriculture in the country at large.
São Paulo's Agricultural Development
• In 1900, when Brazil's coffee exports by quantum were some four times
it their level of the 1840's, São Paulo already accounted for about 50per
'°Cf.Dorival Teixeira Vieira, "The Industrialization of Brazil" (unpublished
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cent of national production and over one-third of world production. In
achieving this position, which was to be further strengthened, São Paulo
rose from an unpromising backwardness. The state had been handi-
capped by sparsity of population, a largely subsistence and capital-poor
agriculture, the lack of export experience and facilities, and inadequate
transportation. During the nineteenth century, coffee production, which
initially had flourished in the state of Rio de Janeiro adjacent to the
port and capital city of the same name, gradually spread into the adjoin-
ing Paralba Valley in eastern São Paulo. This slave-based coffee brought
rapidly declining physical yields as exploitative techniques led to soil
exhaustion, soil erosion, and land abandonment. Thus, coffee seemed to
be following the familiar unhappy Brazilian pattern—with every pros-
pect of receiving its coup de grace from the abolition of slavery. In fact,
coffee might have shared the indifferent destiny of Brazilian agriculture
in the second half of the nineteenth century, had it not been for the
existence of vast virgin lands to the west, the transportation improve-
ments that made these new lands accessible for exploitation and devel-
opment, and the more venturesome spirit of the paulistas and the new
immigrant class.
4
Theopening in 1867 of a British-built railway connecting the port
of Santos with the city of São Paulo marked the conquest of the state's
only major physical barrier to railway development, the formidable
coastal escarpment. This line initiated the railway expansion that was
to pace the exploitative but persistent westward march of coffee across
the state. By 1886, the center of production was north and northeast of
the state capital, and the Paralba Valley's share of São Paulo's coffee
production had fallen to only 20 per cent. Thereafter, coffee expansion
proceeded on the basis of free labor, attracted, from abroad by a well-
organized and effective recruitment campaign. Less hampered by tradi-
tion, which now weighed heavy upon those older regions that had once
prospered under a slave-based agrarian system, the paulistas greatly
invigorated by this influx of immigrants were at last in a position to turn
their pioneer tradition of vigor and venturesomeness to good account.
By 1920, coffee production in São Paulo was five times its level of 1886,
accounting for 79 per cent of Brazilian output and 61 per cent of world
production. Brazil as a whole supplied 75 per cent of world output while
depending on coffee for about 76 per cent of its exports by value. With
coffee production now centered in the middle third of the state, São
Paulo's share of the national population had increased to 15 per cent
from 9.7 per cent in 1890.
Production in São Paulo continued to increase and to move west-F
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ward until 1934, when it stood 80 per cent over 1918, with two-thirds
to coming from the westernmost third of the state. In this latter year the
absolute level of the nation's production reached itshistorical high.
Brazil's century-long coffee boom was approaching its end under the
onslaught of world-wide depression, serious over-production, and the
temporary suspension of national coffee price-support policies. During
ie 1931—40, Brazil still accounted for 64 per cent of world production and
São Paulo for 68 per cent of the Brazilian total. By the early 1950's,
it after sharp reductions in coffee production in the interim, these figures
stood at 50 and 45 per cent, respectively. Production now followed
'to closely the• volume of exports, and this was still at its approximate abso-
lute levels of the 1930's. But by now, coffee culture had crossed São
•t, Paulo's western borders and had spread southwestward to the virgin
•re soils of the rich (but climatically more hazardous) northern region of
the state of Paraná. With the highly favorable coffee prices of the 1950's,
production rebounded sharply. By the end of the decade, it reached new
1.. all-time peaks far in excess of the increase in exports, creating a serious
w new surplus situation. In the process, however, leadership in coffee pro-
duction passed suddenly from São Paulo to Paraná. In 1959 the for-
rt mer's rather moderate increase in production was completely eclipsed
's by the latter's five-fold increase. As a result, São Paulo's share of
Ic Brazilian production averaged only 22 per cent in 1962—64 as compared
-is with Paraná's 48 per cent. By that time, while coffee still accounted for
53 per cent of the nation's exports by value, Brazil's world share had
fallen to perhaps 41 per cent.'7 The recent decline in the relative im-
portance of coffee in São Paulo marks the end of a prolonged period of
a coffee development that undoubtedly played a major role in getting a
1- self-sustaining process of economic growth under way in the state and
i- hence in Brazil. First, exploitative as the process was, it was because
of the unrelenting quest for virgin soil for the expansion of coffee pro-
[y duction that the entire state was at last completely settled. In the
course of this development, an infrastructure and general economic cli-
t. mate were created in São Paulo that also favored the settlement and
development of the states to the south, west, and north as they were
drawn progressively into its economic orbit. Prior to the development
te of São Paulo, exploitative agriculture had left few long-run benefits in
Brazil. But it enabled this state to establish an economic primacy, first
.0 in agriculture and then in manufacturing, that produced lasting fruits for
"These historical data on coffee developments are largely based on those
• published in Agricultura em São Paulo (Secretaria da Agricultura do Estado de
São Paulo), Vol. 8, August 1961, Table 1, p. 21.326 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
the entire nation. By 1960, São Paulo had 18.3 per cent of Brazil's
population. The state still accounted for 23 per cent of the nation's value
of agricultural production (down from 33.4 per cent in 1948—52) and
produced 57.1 per cent of its value added by manufactures (up sharply
from 33.8 and 47 per cent in 1920 and 1950, respectively). Altogether,
São Paulo was responsible for 32.3 per cent of the national income, with
a per capita income of about U.S. $605, 178 per cent of the national
average of that time. That the benefits were beginning to spread to the
rest of the country is shown, however, by the fact that São Paulo's ad-
vantage in per capita income had been considerably higher (221 per cent
of the national average) a decade earlier.
Second, federal policy in regard to the coffee crisis of the f930's had
important, if unforeseen consequences, direct and indirect. Although
clearly oriented to the special interests of the politically powerful coffee
sector, it acted to stimulate diversification in both agriculture and the
general economy. Brazil's price-support policy, under which the equiv-
alent of about one-third of total production during the decade was de-
stroyed, encouraged the loss of world markets to competing countries.
However, this effect was partially offset by the similar effects of U.S.
cotton price-support policy that gave Brazilian agriculture an incentive
to substitute cotton for coffee on a substantial scale. Henceforth cotton
resumed its rank as Brazil's largest export after coffee (14.3 per cent of
total value in 1931—40, and 8.3 per cent in 1962—64).
Much more important, however, Brazil's coffee-defense policy pro-
vided the excuse for a tremendous injection of purchasing power—
financed by correspondingly large increases in the money supply—into
the coffee economy. The unprecedented magnitude of this expansionary
monetary policy had a powerful anticyclical effect. With a sharp drop
in commodity imports consequent on the foreign-exchange crisis, the
demand for domestic manufactures was greatly stimulated. As a result,
during the 1930's, idle resources were effectively turned to the pro-
duction of agricultural and industrial goods for the internal market, with
real increases of 40 and 50 per cent respectively during 1929—37, de-
spite a halving of the value of exports. Investment was maintained at a
moderate or better-than-moderate level, fundamental structural changes
in the Brazilian economy were begun as agricultural savings were in-
vested in the industrial sector, and dependence on foreign trade as the
principal stimulus of national economic development was sharply re-
duced.
Coming hard on the heels of the Great Depression, World War II
gave a more pronounced fillipto domestic manufactures than hadThe Case of Brazil 327
World War I. With foreign competition diminished, importable goods
scarce, and a heavy wartime demand for many of its primary products,
Brazil was able to reduce coffee stocks to manageable proportions dur-
ing the 1940's while accumulating large foreign-exchange balances.
r Although the government failed to act as effectively as it might have to
protect these balances, and consequently they suffered considerable dis-
al sipation through large-scale imports of consumer goods during 1947—50,
ie industrial (physical) production increased by 40 per cent 4uring 1944—
50, with producer goods up 110 per cent and consumer goods 26 per
nt cent.'8
In 1953, now firmly committed to a policy of promoting import-
substituting domestic manufactures, the Brazilian government estab-
lished an elaborate system of multiple-exchange rates that discriminated
ee against the traditional exports (coffee, cotton, and cocoa) while favoring
imports of industrial machinery and producer goods. The purpose was
clearly to capture a large portion of the exchange earnings of these
e- agricultural exports for general development purposes, thereby further-
ing industrial growth un4er a policy of strong protectionism—a policy
S. that was heavily reinforced by the tariff act of 1957. Brazilian agricul-
ye ture derived some benefits from subsidized exchange rates on imports
of fertilizer and petroleum products. But these gains could scarcely off-
of set the substantial reductions in the domestic prices of agricultural ex-
ports and the even harder blow from the steep rise in prices of the other
modem agricultural inputs, such as tractors and trucks, in the produc-
— donof which highly protected domestic industries were an increasing
to factor. Even this exchange discrimination against coffee was not severe
enough, with the abnormally high world price that prevailed in the
1950's, to prevent a very rapid expansion in coffee production in that
ft
era. Therefore, although late in the same decade the government was
remunerating coffee exporters for only about half their actual foreign-
th exchange earnings, much of the surplus thus syphoned off was dissipated
by the costs of the coffee price-support program. According to Baer, the
•a subsidies more than compensated the coffee producers for the discrimi-
les 18Cf.Ruy Miller Paiva, "Contribuicao da Agricultura ao Desenvolvimento
Ecônomico do Brasil," Agriculiura em São Paulo, Vol. 8 (August, 1961), pp. 46-.
49.
e In emphasizing the contributions of the coffee-defense policy to Brazil's indus-
re- trial development of the 1930's, we have followed the "accepted" interpretation of
such authorities as Furtado and Baer. However, in a recent article ("A Balanca
II Comercial, a Grande Depressão. e Industrializacao Brasileira," Revisla Brasileira
de Economia, March, 1968), Prof. Carlos Pelaez presents strong evidence that this
ad interpretation is substantially overstated or even wrong.
Ir
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natory coffee exchange rate and contributed signfficantly to the inflation
that had become the principal engine for financing industrialization.
If the government was partially thwarted in its objective of exploiting
the agricultural surplus for the financing of industrial development, the
fault lay not so much in the objective as in the failure to prevent the non-
export (domestic food) sector of agriculture from becoming a serious
bottleneck in the developmental process. With per capita physical food
consumption increasing by 22 per cent and total population by 45per
cent during 1950—62, the terms of trade had turned in favor of agri-
culture, primarily because of a lag in the expansion of livestock and
livestock products, whose higher managerial requirements and greater
dependence on purchased inputs favored an inelastic supply response
in the face of their higher income elasticities of demand. This condition
resulted in the transfer of part of the savings of the nonagricultural
sector to the commercial sector (agricultural middlemen) and large
landholders, and a good percentage of this part probably found its way
into investments in the nonagricultural sector as well as in land, farm
machinery, and other tangible hedges against inflation. With the recent
rapid increases in the relative costs of modern agricultural inputs, how-
ever, the low priority given by government policy to improving the
productivity of domestic food production has discouraged the invest-
¶
mentof such savings in the modernization of agriculture. In any case,
it appears that the use of inflation as a technique of "forced saving"
for financing the industrialization process served to transfer real income
from the wage-earning class to the entrepreneurial class through the lag
in the rise of real wages (a process that had about run its course by the
early 1960's), with the heaviest burden falling on rural cash-wage
workers 19
Thatthe reallocation of agricultural resources has not been proceed-
ing fast enough to meet the increasing domestic demand for food or the
changing composition of the Brazilian diet does not mean that signifi-
cant changes have not been under way. In 1948—52, coffee still held
a marked lead in its contribution to São Paulo's gross farm income (32
per cent) followed by cotton (16 per cent) and cattle (13 per cent).
Rice, corn, milk, and sugar-cane together accounted for another 23
per cent. Crops still provided 78 per cent of total income, as compared
with only 22 per cent for livestock products. But the stage was now set
for an acceleration in the diversification of São Paulo's agriculture. Thus,
during the 1950's, coffee's share of gross farm income fell from 32 to
19WernerBaer, Industrialization and Economic Development jn Brazil, Home-
wood, Illinois, 1965, pp. 48—58, 117—18, 161—62.The Case of Brazil 329
19 per cent, cotton's share from 16 to 9 per cent, and rice's share from
U 8 to 6 per cent. The contribution of cattle production grew from 13 to
18 per cent, actually surpassing coffee in 1960 and 1961. The combined
share of coffee, cotton, and rice dropped from 56to34 per cent. The
- combinedshares of corn, sugar-cane, potatoes, peanuts, beans, and to-
matoes increased from 18 to 28 per cent. Nonetheless, the share of all
d crops was reduced from 78 to 66 per cent, while the contribution of
cattle, milk, swine, eggs combined showed an increase from 22 to 34
per cent.2°
d Despite these recent changes, São Paulo in 1962 still ranked first
among the states in the total output of cotton, sugar-cane, potatoes,
bananas, oranges, fowl, and eggs; second in coffee and milk; third in
number of cattle and in corn and beans; fourth in rice; and fifth in swine.
São Paulo's agricultural economy was at last entering a new, more ma-
re ture stage with the growth of thestate's industrial-urban complex.
Finally settled to its western limits, the state was in the process of re-
placing its previously migratory and exploitative export-oriented agricul-
it ture with a more stable and conservative system, oriented more toward
supplying the rapidly growing food needs of domestic urban markets
and more firmly based on modern scientific knowledge and the use of
the purchased agricultural inputs, which the new industrial sector was
now in a position to furnish, hopefully at remunerative prices.
Industrial-Urban Development in São Paulo
São Paulo's industrial-urban development lagged several decades be-
hind its agricultural development. The manufacture of cotton textiles,
Brazil's pioneer manufacturing industry, was at first concentrated in
1- Bahia and other eastern and northern states. By 1900, however, this
industry was centered in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Only after 19 14
: 1- did São Paulo outstrip Rio in textile production, accounting by 1919
for 36 per cent of Brazil's textile output. In 1907, São Paulo had only
2 16 per cent of the nation's manufacturing workers: the Federal District
). (cityof Rio) and adjoining state of Rio de Janeiro had 32 per cent.
:3 By 1919, these percentages were 34 and 31, respectively, underscoring
São Paulo's dramatic strides in the interim. In the latter year, the state
et produced (by value of production) not only 36 per cent of Brazil's tex-
s, tiles, but also 55percent of its transportation equipment, 38—49 per
to cent of its nonmetallic mineral products, paper and fiberboard, metal-
e- RubensAra(ijo Dias, "Renda Bruta da Agricultura," Agricultura em São
Paulo,Vol.9 (Jan. 1962), Table II, p. 38.
I
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lurgical products, clothing and shoes; and 22—34 per cent of its hides
and leather, beverages, food products, furniture, rubber products, chemi-
cals and drugs, and wood products. Of São Paulo's total value added by
manufactures, textile products contributed the largest share (29 per
cent), followed by food products (20 per cent), clothing and shoes
(9 per cent), and beverages (7 per cent)—for a combined total of 65
percent.2'
During 1872—1900, the population of the state of São Paulo in-
creased nearly three-fold and during 1900—1920 it doubled again, in-
creasing the state's share of the nation's population from 8.4 to 15 per
cent. During the earlier period, the population of the city of São Paulo
jumped from about 31,000 to almost 240,000, doubling again to
579,000 by 1920—with the corresponding shares of the state's popula-
tion at 3.8, 10.5 and 12.6 per cent in the three reference years. Such a
high rate of population growth owed much to large-scale immigration.
Approximately 1,765,000 foreign immigrants (nearly half Italian and
another third Spanish and Portuguese) entered the state during 1880— t
1920,the equivalent of 77 per cent of the state's total population in
1900. Most immigrants whose ocean passage had been paid by the U
federal or state government were obligated to agricultural employment,
but most nonsubsidized immigrants elected to remain in the cities.
During the periodic crises in coffee (e.g., in 1902—08), the influx of
foreign immigrants declined sharply, but urban growth continued on
the basis of increased internal rural-urban migration of the foreign-born
as well as native-born population. The large foreign-born component
of this internal migration is reflected in the statistics for the city of São
Paulo. By 1920 35 per cent of the population was foreign-born as corn-
pared with only 16 per cent for the rest of the state.22
Up to 1920, São Paulo had also attracted, besides this valuable human
capital from abroad, an increasing flow of foreign investment capital
directed toward developing coffee plantations (although foreign owner-
ship was never a substantial factor), railways and electrical power in-
stallations, and a limited amount of manufacturing. It was during the war
years 1914—20 that São Paulo's industrial development received its first
major impetus. This happened largely under indigenous business leader-
Cf. Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler (ed), Eco.
nomic Growth: Brazil,India, Japan,Duke University Press, Durham, NC.,
1955;especiallythe chapters contributed by George Wythe (pp. 37—41 and 49)
and Stanley J. Stein (pp. 430—40).
22 VicenteUnzer deAlmeidaandOctavioTeixeiraMendes Sobrinho,
Migracdo Rural-Urbana, Secretaria da Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo, 1951,
p. 80; and Kuznets, et a!., op. cit., pp. 39—40 and 439—40.
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ship,although the representation of foreign-born was probably higher
than proportionate. The elimination of foreign competition in the face
of the scarcity of industrial goods and shipping—combined with high
wartime profits on exports of primary products and with high domestic
purchasing power—provided the opportunity, promptly seized, for a
5 considerable expansion of domestic manufacturing. As a result, by 1920
real industrial production in Brazil stood at about 250 per cent of its
1- 1914level and in São Paulo at about 340 per cent. Even so, in 1920,
I only13 per cent of the Brazilian labor force was gainfully employed in
"manufacturing," a category in which many small workshops and do-
mestic handicraft operations were included.
The 1920's were not a very propitious period for further Brazilian
industrial development. The renewed influx of foreign manufactures
a was a setback to Brazil's fledgling industries at a time when government
policy, while protecting coffee producers to an extent that encouraged
ci substantial overproduction, yielded to a resurgence of "free-trade" sen-
•
— timentin the country and shunned industrial protection. Nonetheless, a
number of large-scale industrial plants (including numerous branch fac-
tories of U.S. firms) were established, notably for automobile assembly
and the production of electrical appliances, tires, cement, rayon, and
• corn products. As a consequence, São Paulo's real industrial production
may have again trebled during 1920—29, although in 1928—29 it stood
at only 50 per cent above its previous peak of 1923.23
In the onslaught of the Great Depression Brazilian exports were
halved, but because of the protectionist aspects of the sharp drop in
foreign exchange, such industrial production as Brazil already enjoyed,
I- washardly affected. Even at its low point in 1932, it was only 12 per
cent below its 1928 peak for Brazil and only 20 per cent below for the
state of São Paulo. Thereafter, the vast pump-priming operation asso-
• ciated with coffee-defense policy began to produce results. First, much
idle plant capacity was brought into use, with very favorable effects on
industrial profits. These made possible the purchase of second-hand
machinery at low prices from abroad and subsequent new industrial in-
vestment, much of it probably of agricultural origin. Thus, we find that
by 1940 Brazilian industrial output was 52 per cent above its 1928
high, while both exports and imports were still one-third below their
level of 1926—30. During the period 1928—40, there was a significant
increase in the variety of chemicals, metal products, processed foods,
textiles, and paper produced, while the production of cottonseed oil and




vegetable shortening grew in conjunction with expanded cotton culture. 2
Nonetheless,while labor productivity had undoubtedly increased con- 1
siderably since 1920, the growth of manufacturing employment had
barely outpaced that of the total labor force, the former's share of the s
latter going from 13 to 14 per cent.
During 1919—39, manufacturing employment in São Paulo more than
trebled. The state's share of the national total increased from 30 to 34 a
per cent and its share of national value added from 34 to 39 per cent. I
The combined share of value added by the city and adjoining state of a
Rio de Janeiro had remained constant at 28 per cent. Of the other
states, representing secondary centers of industrialization, Rio Grande a
do Sul had declined in relative importance from 11.5 to 9.1 per cent I
while Minas Gerais and Pernambuco had shown gains, from 5.6to7.8 lq
per cent and from 4.3 to 4.9 per cent, respectively. These four (ex-
cluding São Paulo) plus the Federal District (city of Rio) just about
maintained their share of 49—50 per cent of the nation's total value added.
• In 1939 these states plus São Paulo accounted for 89 per cent. The
primacy of São Paulo is shown by its contribution to the nation's value
added, as follows: by manufactures of transportation equipment, elec- til
• trical products, mechanical products, and textiles—66—87 per cent; by
public utilities, chemicals and drugs, paper, clothing and shoes, furni-
ture, metallurgical products, printing and publishing, and beverages—
38—49 per cent; and by tobacco products, rubber goods, and food prod-
ucts—33—34 per cent. During 1919—39, the composition of São Paulo's
total value added (excluding construction, public utilities, and extractive
industries) had significantly changed. While textiles and food products
still contributed 28 and 15 per cent, respectively, their combined share
plus clothing, shoes, and beverages, had dropped from 65to52 per cent, I
while the combined share of chemicals and drugs, transportation equip-
ment, nonmetallic mineral products, and metallurgical products had al
• increased from 18 to 31 per cent. aJ
During 1920—40, while the population of the state of São Paulo in-
creased by 56percent (as compared with 35 per cent for the whole
nation), the population of the city of São Paulo more than doubled to sç
• 1,326,261(its share of the state's population growing from 12.6 to
18.5 per cent). By 1940, with 17.4 per cent of the nation's population,
the state had 28.3 per cent of all cities of 10,000 or more (and 31 per 1.
centof the population living in such cities) and 14.1 per cent of the 8,
rural population. This continued high rate of population growth had
become increasingly a function of internal migration. Most of the 659,000 dZ
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22 per cent Italian and Spanish) which the state received during
192 1—46 entered before the more restrictive immigration policies went
into effect after 1930. As a result, during 1920—40, the foreign-born
share of the population dropped from 35to22 per cent in the capital
city and from 16 to 9 per cent in the rest of the state. Even in 1940,
however, about 60 per cent of São Paulo's population was still rural
and employed in agriculture. Significantly, the illiteracy rate in São
Paulo was 48 per cent, still relatively high, although the national aver-
age was 62 per cent.
With its decided headstart São Paulo was in an ideal position to take
advantage of the Second World War and of the conscious shift of the
Brazilian government to an all-out policy of industrialization that fol-
lowed in the 1950's. Thus, São Paulo's share of the nation's manufactur-
ing employment, 34 per cent in 1939, increased to 38 per cent in 1949
and attained 50 per cent by 1962; and its share of the nation's value
added increased from 39 to 47 per cent during the 1940's reaching 57
per cent in 1962.
São Paulo may be considered part of a broader industrial complex
that is growing up within the triangle defined by the cities of São Paulo,
• Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), and Rio de Janeiro. But considered
• without São Paulo, this area's share of national value added fell from 36
• to 23 per cent during the period 1939—62. At the same time the share
•
• ofthe state of Rio dropped from 28 to 18 per cent and that of the state
of Minas Gerais from 7.8 to 5.3 per cent. During the same period, the
shares of the outlying industrial centers of Rio Grande do Sul and
Pernambuco also dropped, from 9.1 to 6.7 per cent and from 4.1 to 2.4
per cent, respectively.24
• By 1962, São Paulo's share of the nation's value added was as fol-
lows: by transportation equipment, rubber goods, electrical appliances,
and mechanical products—75—89 per cent; by paper, plastics, chemicals
and drugs, textiles, furniture, metallurgical products, nonmetallic min-
erals, and clothing and shoes—50—65 per cent; and, by printing and
publishing, food products, and public utilities—41—46 per cent. Of the
• six leading industries in São Paulo, transportation equipment now led
with 15.8 per cent of total value added, followed by textiles, down to
14 per cent; chemicals and drugs, 11.7 per cent; metallurgical products,
11 per cent; food products, down to only 9.6 per cent; and electrical
goods, 7.8 per cent. Since 1940, the composition of São Paulo's industrial
24 The data for 1939 and 1949 are based on the Censuses of 1940 and 1950;
• data for 1962 are from annual Industrial Register (Anudrio Estatistico do Brasil,
1965, Rio de Janeiro, 1965, p. 104 et seq.).
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production had shifted sharply toward the more skilled,durable-
consumer-goods and heavy-producer-goods industries. The combined
share of textiles, food, clothing and shoes, and beverages (65 per cent
in 1919) fell from 52 to only 28 per cent during 1939—62; and the corn-
bined share of wood products, furniture, tobacco products, and hides
and leather (10 per cent in 1919) fell from 7 to 4.4 per cent. These
eight industries combined, which had accounted for 75 per cent of São
Paulo's 1919 value added and still accounted for 40 per cent for all
Brazil, accordingly dropped from 59 to 32 per cent in the same period.
By 1949, Brazil was already nearly self-sufficient (imports less than
5 per cent of domestic consumption) in processed foods, beverages,
printing and publishing, and textiles. By that time, its domestic manu-
facture of paper, cement, and iron and steel were already sufficiently
developed to require imports of only 18—25 per cent of domestic needs. t
On the other hand it was still heavily dependent (39—80 per cent) upon
imports to meet its requirements for chemicals, machinery, electrical
goods, motor vehicles and other transportation equipment, and non-
ferrous metal products. Ten years later, thanks to a drive to develop
import-substituting industries, Brazil had attained virtual self-sufficiency
in cement while continuing to import only 12—18 per cent of its paper,
electrical products, motor vehicles, iron and steel, and chemicals. While f
Brazil still imported 57 per cent of its metal-working machinery (down
from 69 per cent a decade earlier), it had cut its imports from 58 to 23
per cent for other machinery; from 80 to 37 per cent for nonferrous
metal products; and from 60 to 38 per cent for transportation other than
motor
In an evaluation of this recent period of government-induced indus-
trialization in Brazil, Huddle has noted its high opportunity costs as the
seeds of its undoing. It was only with the establishment of the multiple-
exchange system and a policy of inflationary financing in 1953 that the
government began to exercise a strong direct influence on the progress
of industrialization. Under the new exchange policy, favored industries
could import capital goods at one-fifth to one-sixth of the exchange cost
to other industries while enjoying absolute protection against foreign
competitors. The effects of inflation were, in turn, to transfer resources
from the rest of the economy to the government, which loaned them to
the same favored industries. With other sources of funds for long-term
investment (including retained industrial earnings) insufficient, the gov-
ernment during 1953—59 extended to the favored industries heavily
subsidized loans in an amount equivalent to the total private fixed-capital
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formation in all industry during the same period. These public loans
averaged 20—30 per cent of the profits of industry as a whole and a much
higher percentage of the profits of the favored industries, which may
have even reduced their own savings out of profits as a result of the
government's generosity.
e By the late 1950's, says Huddle, unfavorable factors began to appear.
As industrialization widened, the original infant industries had to pur-
chase more and more inputs from new, high-cost industries with un-
reliable delivery schedules. Furthermore, with agriculture neglected and
the prices of agricultural inputs increased, food products began to rise
and workers began to demand higher wages, more frequently adjusted for
inflation. Efforts to neutralize this development through price controls
and export restrictions on food products were unsuccessful and tended
to reduce import capacity and to drive up the exchange price of imports.
This happened despite a new policy of import-substitution in the auto-
mobile-parts industries, a policy whose effects (indirect as well as direct)
reduced imports less than appeared on the surface. With this switch in
public favor to the automotive industries together with the steady rise
y in food prices and wages, the nonautomotive industries found themselves
in an increasingly difficult financial position. Moreover, the industries
e favored by the government were increasingly capital intensive, with a
a strong antiemployment bias that created a hardship for the unskilled,
3 not only in the urban areas, but also in rural regions where workers
could hope for nothing better, if they migrated to the cities, than employ-
ment in a low-productivity service industry. Huddle concludes that, if
the new industrialization strategy of 1957—58 "had been focused instead
upon removing disincentives in the agricultural and export sectors, while
e retaining the incentives earlier given to a broad spectrum of manufac-
turing in4ustries, the post-1962 stagnation, as well as increasing unem-
e ployment and underemployment, might have been averted." 26
Whetheror not Huddle's pessimistic but plausible appraisal of Brazil's
recent industrialization policy is fully justified, there can be little doubt
that São Paulo was the major beneficiary. During 1940—62, the state's
n population again virtually doubled. Its share of the nation's population
was 18.4 per cent, compared to 17.4 per cent in 1940 and 15 per cent
in 1920. The 1950's saw the city of São Paulo finally pass the city of
Rio to become Brazil's largest. In 1962 its population of 4,251,000 was
26Thisand the preceding paragraph are a summary of a recent preliminary
paper by Don L. Huddle, "Notes on the Brazilian Industrialization: Sources of
• Growth and Structural Change 1947—1963," Economic Growth Center, Yale
University ("Center Paper No. 30"), June 2,1967 (mimeo.); particularly pp.
18—23.
-J336 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
30.7 per cent of the total for the state, comparedto 18.5 per cent in
1940 and 12.6 per cent in 1920. During 1940—50, the numberof cities
in the state with a population of 20,000or more increased from 16 to
28. By 1960, rural population was only 37per cent of the total in São
Paulo compared to 60 per cent in 1940 and 54per cent in Brazil in 1960.
Much of this population growth resulted from internalmigration
from the poorer states, São Paulo gainedsome 557,000 native-born in-
migrants (approximating the 581,000 lost by the northeasternstates of
Bahia, Ceará, and Pernambuco) during 1940—50alone. To some
extent this migration was rural-to-rural, with in-migration to therural
areas of São Paulo partially offsetting rural-to-urban migration ofper-
sons born in the state. Although the old Federal District (city of Rio)
gained 788,000 in-migrants (clearly rural-to-urban) during the1950's,
rural-to-rural migration continued to be important throughout thatdec-
ade because of the attraction of the remaining agricultural frontiers.
Thus the three frontier states of Paraná, Goiás, and Mato Grosso—aJl
within São Paulo's economic orbit—gained close to 900,000 peopleby
net in-migration during 1940—50 and perhaps 2,000,000or more dur-
ing 1950—60. This is approximately one-third of the total rural-to-urban
migration in Brazil during the two decades. During thesame two decades,
the northern state of Maranhão may have gained 250,000or more by
in_migration.27
The New Problem: Generalizing São Paulo's Development
to All of Brazil
Clearly, if the state of São Paulo (witha per capita income of $605 in
1960) were a separate country, it would already be approaching (like
Japan) a developed-country status. Unfortunately,as Brazilians have
been saying for two or three decades, "São Paulo is the locomotive
pulling twenty freight cars"—meaning of course, the othertwenty states
of Brazil. But the fact that Brazil finally has a locomotive,a state whose
power is already substantially contributing to the economic develop-
ment of the whole southeast region which it dominates, representsno
mean achievement. The principal remaining problem is that of reducing
the wide interregional income disparities. Thoseare dramatized by the
Comparisons of Table 1. There it will be noted that in 1960 the eight
1;
statesconstituting the "southeast" region (dominated by the cities in
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) had 61 per cent of the nation's popula-
21 Cf. a preliminary benchmark studyon Brazilian agriculture by I. Edward
Schuh and Eliseu Roberto Alves, mimeo. draft of June 1967, particularlypp.
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tion and, with a per capita income of $456, 80 per cent of its national
income.
The two frontier states that composed the midwest region, sparsely
populated yet clearly within São Paulo's orbit, ranked second with only
$210, but, in respect to both population and per capita income, were
expanding faster than any other region. As a result, per capita income
in the midwest region, relative to the southeast's, rose from 40 to 46
per cent during 1947—60. Much more important in 1960, however, was S
the"arid northeast," made up of eight states with a per capita income
of $180, only 39 per cent of that enjoyed in the prospering southeast 8
region. This clearly disadvantaged region, with 28 per cent of the' na- a
tion's population, received only 15 per cent of the national income.
It was the only major region with a declining share of the population t
during 1950—60. Finally, the three states of the "humid north" region, 1
largely in the Amazonian rain forest, had in 1960 a per capita income e
of $156, only 34 per cent of that of the southeast, as compared to 39 h
per cent in 1947. Even the northeast had succeeded in closing the in- t
come gap with the southeast slightly (from 37 per cent in 1947), thanks a
largely to its low rate of population growth (lowest of the four regions),
a consequence of heavy out-migration. The north region's population,
on the other hand, grew at a much faster rate, so that even though aggre-
gate income increased, the effects of this gain on per capita income were
partially canceled. 11
In the'period 1947—60, five states (including São Paulo) within the
southeast region enjoyed increases of 44—49 per cent in per capita in- I
come.By comparison the national average increase was 51 per cent. The
state of Paraná had an increase of 62 per cent, far above the national
average. Paraná doubled its population, chiefly because of large-scale
settlement on its rich agricultural frontier. Three states, Minas Gerais,
Santa Catarina, and the old Federal District, showed relatively low
gains of 33—39 per cent. In both 1947 and 1960, the eight states of the
southeast region ranked among the top ten in terms of per capita in-
come. The highest ranking states in 1960 were the old Federal District
($989), SãoPaulo ($605),RioGrande do Sul ($408), Paraná ($377),
Rio de Janeiro ($323), and Santa Catarina ($306). Only the last two
changed rank between 1947 and 1960. In 1947 the two remaining states
of the southeast, Minas Gerais ($241) and Espirito Santo ($218)
ranked ninth and tenth, while Amazonas (still enjoying the ephemeral
wartime rubber boom) ranked seventh and Mato Grosso eighth. In
1960 the two southeastern states ranked eighth and tenth, with Mato
t11
Grosso ($265) in seventh and Amazonas ($231) still in ninth place. 011
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In the latter year, Pernambuco led the northeast region with $204,
having displaced the Amazonian state of Path for eleventh place.
With 61 per cent of Brazil's population, the eight southeastern states
in 1960—62 had 49 per cent of the nation's agricultural labor force, 62
per cent of its cropland, 91 per cent of its tractors, and 58 per cent of
e its cattle. They accounted for 65 per cent by value of the nation's crop
6 production and 81 per cent by value of its milk production, and they
slaughtered 72 per cent of the nation's cattle and 78 per cent of its hogs.
e With 82 per cent of Brazil's installed electrical generating capacity and
88 per cent of its personnel engaged in manufacturing, the southeast
accounted for 89 per cent of all value added by manufacturing. This
group of states had 72 per cent of those engaged in wholesale and retail
trade in the nation and they handled 85 per cent of this trade. Thus, by
• 1 1960the states of the southeast region had more or less generally
entered into a phase of self-sustaining economic development. Coffee
9 had provided the original impetus (as it was stifi doing in Paraná) but
1- thesubsequent substantial industrial-urban development in São Paulo
and Rio de Janeiro had gradually spread to the other states of the region,
further strengthening both theagricultural and thenonagricultural
1 sectors.
By 1950 industrial-urban development had already had important
favorable effects on agricultural incomes and productivity in São Paulo.
This can be demonstrated by an investigation of the period 1940—50,
before government policy had substituted a strong element of direction
and control for the free play of market forces.
ii
le
INDUSTRIAL-URBAN DEVELOPMENT AS A
DYNAMIC FORCE IN TRANSFORMING
BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURE, 1940-50
In 1961, Anthony M. Tang and the author completed a ten-year
research project on the effects of industrial-urban development (via
the factor markets) on agricultural productivity and income in the
Southern Piedmont and the Tennessee Valley. Each of us studied a
group of some twenty contiguous counties that had a common historical
and cultural background, and that 50—75 years ago had approximately
the same dependence on agriculture and roughly the same levels of
e. output per farm worker. Each group was differentiated into countiesT
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that had remained largely rural-agricultural (the control group) and
those that had since experienced substantial industrialization, to
We observed that, during the preindustrial period, initial income dif-
ferences attributable to differences in "original" physical endowment in
tended to disappear through factor transfers (particularly labor) despite
imperfections in the factor markets. We further observed, however, that
ahalf century,thosecountiesthat experienceddifferentially
higher rates of industrial-urban development also enjoyed increasingly
superior capital-labor ratios and labor productivity within their agri- re
culture, while neighboring counties that lacked industrial-urban develop-
ment also lagged behind on the agricultural side. These findings thus
strongly support the view that local industrial-urban development makes
an important positive contribution to the efficiency of the local factor
and product markets, thereby greatly facilitating the transfer of excess
labor from, and of needed capital to, agriculture, within the immediate
environs of the growing industrial center.28
During 1961—62, I conducted a study of the state of São Paulo Pal
along similar lines, using data from the federal censuses of 1940 and
1950. This state, containing the industrial heartland of Brazil, was the tick
natural choice, not only because of the level of nonagricultural de- -
veiopmentreached, but also because of the length of time over which
the development had been going on—presumably ample in this case
for the effects on agriculture to become fully apparent. As a substitute
for the counties used as subareas in the U.S. study, I used the "twenty- U9
threephysiographic zones" distinguished in the 1950 census. Because
of the inadequacies of earlier censuses, the analysis was limited to the am
decade 1940—50. Hopes of adding the decade 1950—60 have so far
beenthwarted by the long delays in publication of the 1960 census re- WtI
suits.
Becauseitis many times larger than our previous twenty-county
study areas, São Paulo has perhaps a somewhat smaller degree of his- to
torical, socio-economic, and cultural homogeneity. Much more serious,
however, is the effect of the shorter time period. Because the analysis
spans only a single decade, it was impossible to compare unindustrialized
subareas with industrialized ones on the basis of similarities that existed
in the preindustrial era. Hence in the São Paulo study there is no con-
28 See Anthony M. Tang, Economic Development in the Southern Piedmont, Nia'
1860—1 950: its impact on Agriculture, Chapel Hill, 1958; and the summary arti-
cle, William H. Nicholls, "Industrialization, Factor Markets, and Agricultural
Development," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XLIX (August 1961), pp. 319— 194
40. cor4The Case of Brazil 341
id trol group. Nonetheless, the results proved to be of sufficient interest
to warrant presentation in summary form here.29
As in our previous analyses, per capita value added by manufacture
nt in 1949 was used as the index of industrial-urban development. The
.te twenty-three physiographic zones were ranked in terms of this index
at and of a large number of other indexes of nonagricultural develop-
ly ment and agricultural and population characteristics in both 1939—40
and 1949—50. The former set of rankings were then systematically cor-
related with the latter sets.
US Industrial Development and
es Structural Characteristics of Agriculture
or
• Table 2 presents some of the interrelationships found between indus-
ite trial development and various structural characteristics of agriculture.
Although the comparisons shown by the averages for Brazil and São
Paulo are also instructive, being generally consistent with São Paulo's
ad higher level of industrial-urban development, we shall focus our atten-
he tion upon the rank correlation coefficients for the twenty-three zones
le- within São Paulo.
ch First, in regard to land utilization, we find that in both 1940 and
tse 1950 São Paulo's more industrialized zones had relatively more of both
ite cropland and pastureland than did thelessindustrialized. Having
undergone an earlier agricultural development, and enjoying better
ise market opportunities, they also had relatively less unused arable land
he and natural woodland. However, these distinctions weakened in most
'ar cases during 1940—50, a reflection, in all probability, of the clearing of
woodland and the expansion of cropland and pastureland that were
underway in the newer (and less industrialized) agricultural zones. (In
our Tennessee Valley study, the more industrialized zones also tended
is- to have more improved land—cropland plusplowable pasture—
and less woodland; the comparable coefficients were .408 * and —.310,
respectively, in Second, while there was not a very strong cor-
relation between industrial development and particular types of farming,
ed the more industrialized zones did have a significantly greater number
(relatively) of livestock-feeding (finishing) farms and farms of mis-
29 The detailed results were presentedina preliminary draft,William H.
;nt, Nicholls, Industrial-Urban Development and Agriculture in São Paulo, Brazil,
rti- 1940—50, Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 1962, pp. 254.
ral 30 Hereafter, the comparable coefficients for the Tennessee Valley (TV) in
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cellaneous type and a somewhat less significantly greater number of
livestock-breeding and crop-livestock farms with fewer crop farms.
Third, relative to their land resources, the more industrialized zones
were not significantly different in number of cattle (TV .3 17). They
did, however, show a consistently greater milk production (again re-
flecting greater market outlets) in both 1940 and 1950 than the zones
of lesser industrial-urban development. While the more industrialized In
zones had significantly less chicken and egg production in 1939—40 Va
relative to land area, this gap had nearly been closed by 1949—50. While
poultry production is hardly dependent upon land area, it is probable Per
that the farmers of the more industrialized zones were already less self-
sufficient (producing less for home consumption) in 1940, and that
the increase in commercial production noted in 1950 reflects the be-
ginnings of their response to urban market demands. This increase was Wo
sufficient to offset the previous effect—a trend that probably continued
in the 1950's to make the correlation coefficient significantly positive. Perri.
However, the strong tendency for hog production per thousand hectares
of cropland to be lower as the zone was more industrial, was only slightly Lii
weakened during 1940—50 (TV .459 **).
Fourth, in terms of the amount of cropland devoted to different crops
(as measured by total physical production), the more industrial-urban
zonesproduced relatively more coffee, sugar-cane, and cotton, crops
on which they depended heavily—and produced relatively less of such Pro1
major subsistence crops as beans, corn (TV —.256),and manioc. The
lead of the first three crops was increased during 1940—50, but the in-
feriority of the latter crops decreased, perhaps because the later-settled, a
less industrialized zones were beginning to produce those products (and j
swine)on an increasingly commercial basis. In any case, the zones of
greater industrial-urban development showed a much higher value of
outputper thousand hectares of all farmland than did the less indus-
trialized zones. While the more industrialized zones did not as yet de-
rive a significantly higher percentage of their total farm income from
livestock and livestock products (and less from crops) than the more
agriculturalzones, developments during 1940—50 indicated a trend
toward this stage. (In the Tennessee Valley, a marked shift in relative
income from corn and tobacco—its major, labor-intensive cash crop—
to livestock production took place during 1930—50. In 1949 coefficients
in the more industrial countries were —.580**and+.580 re-
spectively, for the crop and livestock shares of total income, indicating,
perhaps, the direction of trends in São Paulo after 1950.) Tot$








































Structural Characteristics of Agriculture, Brazil and Sao Paulo:
Selected Indexes with Comparisons between the National and
State Averages, 1949—50, and with Coefficients of Rank
Correlation Between These Indexes and 1949 Per Capita Value
Added by Manufacture for Twenty-three Zones of Sao Paulo,
1939 and 1949a
Index Correlated with 1949






Percentage of all farmland
(area) by use
Cropland 8.2 22.4.590* *.439*
Pasture 46.3 45.5•399* 359*







Percentage of all farms
(number) by type
Livestock-feeding farms 1.4 2.0 — .360*
Livestock-breeding farms 6.7 5.3 — .293
Crop-livestock farms 29.0 22.2 — .266
Crop farms 60.0 65.2 — -.185
Other types 1.1 1.6 — .483**
Production per 1,000 hectares
pasture
Milk (thousands of liters) 25.6 59.5.582** 513**
Head of cattle (excl. calves
and oxen) 342 547 .184 .126
Production per 1,000 hectares
of all cropland
Coffee (tons) 102 203 .392* .442*
Sugar-cane (tons) 1,200 1,123 .263 .486**
Cotton (tons) 40 105 .256 .258
Rice (tons) 146 174 .061 .120
Manioc (tons) 578 53 —.298 —.215
Corn (tons) 349 278 —.342 —.160
Beans (tons) 65 23
Eggs (thousands of dozen) 9.7 10.2 —.033
Chickens 3,871 3,027 —.179
Hogs (excluding pigs) 676 379
Value of farm output per
1,000 hectares farmland n.a. $31,267 .638** .584**











Index Correlated with 1949






Percentage of total farm
income from
Crops n.a. 81 .311 .107
Livestock n.a. 19 —.311 —.107
Farmland per farm (hectares) 112.5 85.8.200 .084
Percentage of all farms with
farmland of
Less than 2 hectares 7.9 1.3.052 .230
2—99 hectares 84.2 85.5—. 160 —.151
Greater than 500 hectares 3.7 2.7.286 .340
Greater than 5,000 hectares 0.22 0.09—.005 —.144
Percentage of all farmland
(area) in farms of
Less than 2 hectares — — — —
2—99 hectares 16.6 24.7—.077 —.268
Greater than 500 hectares 62.1 46.8 .130 .200
Greater than 5,000 hectares 26.7 10.9—.168
Percentage of farmland in
largest 5 per cent of farms 68 57 .009 .066
Percentage of all farms
(number) with cropland of
Less than 2 hectares 25.4 6.1n.a. .061
Less than 100 hectares 99.4 97.5 n.a. —.602**
Greater than 1,000 hectares .01 .04n.a.
.
Percentage of all farms,
"large scale" farms by type
All 9.5 17.6na. .520*4
Crop-livestock 1.3 3.2 n.a.
Crop 4.7 12.6 n.a. .279
Livestock 3.5 1.8 n.a. .014
Percentage of all farms
(number) operated by
Hired administrator 5.6 7.9 .633*
Owner 75.2 64.6 .334 .068








The Case of Brazil
TABLE 2 (concluded)
Source: Brazil's General Censuses of 1940 and 1950.
345
aThestatistical significance of the correlation coefficients is
indicated at the I per cent level (**) and 5 per cent level (*).
bNationaland state average for each index. Units as indicated
except that all values are in U.S. dollars, converted at the rate of
30 Cruzeiros per dollar.
Index Correlated with 1949






Percentage of farm labor
force supplied by






















Number of farm workers
per farm 4.41 5.76.583**.483**
Value of field machinery
per farm $29 $91 .683** 579**
Motorized vehicles per 1,000
hectares of cropland
Field tractors 0.37 0.75.420* .400*
Motor trucks 1.29 2.18.412* .366*
Percentage of all farms
(number) by type of power .
Animal 26.9 53.2 — .405*
Animal and mechanical 0.3 1.2 — .369*
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lated to the size distribution of landholdings. The more industrial zones a
did show a more marked differentiation in size extremes, with relatively
more farms of very small size (less than 2 hectares) and of large size e
(greater than 500 hectares). But, if we take land area into account, we
find that these zones had less land held in huge (greater than 5,000
hectares) farms. There was no relationship between industrial develop- t
ment and concentration of land ownership, although if cropland only
is considered, industrialized zones had relatively fewer farms with less
than 100 hectares and relatively more with more than 1,000 hectares. In
any case, the farms of the more industrialized zones were more inten- f
sively utilized, with significantly larger proportions classified by the
census as "large-scale" farms (requiring rather modest minimum ab-
( solute levels of cropland and livestock numbers) and as "large-scale"
crop-livestock farms, although the same was not true for "large-scale"
crop or livestock farms.
While by far the most common farm-operator in all parts of Säo
( Paulo was the landowner (whether operating the unit through share-
cropper subunits or as a single unit with his family and cash-wage
workers), the moderate but nonsignificant tendency in 1940 for the
more industrialized zones to have relatively more owner-operated farms
and fewer renter-operated farms (TV .337 and —.337)had completely hJ
disappeared by 1950. However, the more industrialized zones in both
years had relatively many more farms operated by hired administrators, 4
suggesting,a higher rate of landlord absenteeism and a more corn-
mercialized operation.
The tendency of industrial-urban development to bring with it a more
highly mechanized and commercialized agriculture is reflected by the
changing composition of the farm labor force. Thus, in1940, the
more industrialized zones clearly showed a heavier dependence upon
male labor, probably reflecting the more mechanized nature of their oi
agriculture. The subsequent weakening of this relationship is perhaps
attributable to the extent to which manual operations declined even in the
less industrialized zones. Otherwise, the most notable difference between
the more and less industrialized zones was the former's much heavier
relative dependence in 1950 on permanent (monthly or full-time) cash-
wage employees and (reflecting the greater scarcity of casual labor in
an industrial-urban zone)lighter relative dependence on temporary
cash-wage day labor. While the more industrialized zones were not yet
less dependent upon share-croppers than the more agricultural zones,
this relationship probably turned significantly negative during the 1950's
as more and more large landowners abandoned cropping on shares for i
Ir
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es a system in which the entire landholding was operated as a single unit
.1y with considerable farm machinery and cash-wage workers. The weak-
ening of the tendency for the more industrialized zones to draw a smaller
ye proportion of their farm-labor force from farm-operator families than
)0 did the zones of lesser industrialization may reflect the fact that, as
p tractor-drawn machinery has displaced animal equipment and the hoe,
ly landowners have proved more willing to participate personally in field
:ss operations.
In It is also interesting to note that, while there was no significant dif-
ference between the zones of greater and lesser industrial-urban de-
'he velopment in average size of farm, as measured by area of farmland
b- (TV .000), the more industrialized zones in São Paulo had more farm
workers (TV .326) and a higher value of farm machinery (TV .184)
•e" and total output per farm (TV .433 *) than the less industrialized.
The more industrialized zones also had significantly more field tractors
(TV .475 *)andmotor trucks per 1,000 hectares of cropland. In all
of these respects, however, the strength of the relationship diminished
ge somewhat during 1940—50, reflecting the ever-widening influence of
• he the growing urban centers, with its favorable effects in terms of in-
ns tensity of land use and the degree of mechanization. Even in 1950,
however, São Paulo's more industrialized zones had (relatively)a
th significantly greater number of farms using animal equipment or animal
rs, and tractor draft-power, with relatively fewer farms whose techniques
were still wholly manual.
re
he The Impact of Industrialization on the Local Capital Market
•he Let us now turn to those indexes most closely related to capital resources
and to the efficiency of the local capital market in transmitting some
of the benefits of industrial-urban development to the capitalization of
PS the nearby agriculture (Table 3).
he First, the data indicate that São Paulo's zones of greater industrial-
urban development enjoyed distinct advantage in the per capita value
•er
• oftotal payrolls and capital (both fixed and inventory capital) in their
• nonagricultural sector. They also had, even more than their counter-
m parts in the Tennessee Valley, higher per capita bank deposits (TV
'3' .729 **)aswell as higher per capita bank loans. The more indus-
ret trialized zones also had a superior infrastructure (as measured by rail-
road density) and greater human capital as the result of greater in-
) S vestments in primary education (TV —.671** forilliteracy rate in
1930) and public health (TV —.200for infant mortality rate). Their
•TABLE 3
Local Capital Market, Brazil and Sao Paulo: Selected indexes with
Comparisons between the National and State Averages, 1949—50, and
with Coefficients of Rank Correlation between These indexes and
1949 Per Capita Value Added by Manufacture for Twenty-three
Zones of Sao Paulo, 1939 and 1949a
Index Correlatedwith 1949







Total payrolls $16.3 $38.5 •939**.930**
Fixed capital 55.9 123.4 n.a. .936**
Inventories 30.0 61.3 n.a. .751**
Bank deposits 49.5 99.8 n.a. .840**
Bank loans 42.6 74.1 n.a. •594**
Kilometers of railroad per
1,000 sq. km. land area 4.4 29.6 n.a. .863**
Percentage foreign- born
Total population 2.3 7.6 .518**.406*
Farm operators 6.3 25.7 .501 ** n.a.
Percentage of males 10+
completed primary school 15.0 27.2 n.a. .856**
Percentage of population
5+ illiterate 57.3 40.4
Crude rate of stillborn births,
1939—42 n.a. 2.45 n.a.
Infant mortality rate,
1939—42 n.a. 175—.290 n.a.
Persons employed per
establishment
Manufacturing 16.5 23.1 799**.701**
Wholesale trade 7.1 8.7 .826**.597**
Retail trade 2.1 2.3 •74Ø**.737**

















Index Correlated with 1949Average






Value of output per
establishment
Manufacturing (value added)$19,867$34,470 .880**•933*s
Wholesale trade (sales) 143,660228,500 n.a. .334
Retail trade (sales) 8,58013,477 •755**•747**
Agriculture (gross output) n.a. 2,683 .658**.638**




(fixed capital) 5,923 7,577 n.a. .334
Wholesale trade
(inventories) 28,70346,437 n.a. .611**
Retail trade (inventories) 3,057 4,677 .410* .607**
Agriculture (fixed capital) n.a. 7,762 .657**•575**
Capital per person employed
Manufacturing (fixed capital 1,168 1,325 •375* .044
Wholesale trade
(fixed capital) 835 869 n.a. —.299
Wholesale trade
(inventories) 4,050 5,327 n.a. .620**
Retail trade (inventories) 1,480 2,021 .308 .430*
Agriculture (fixed capital) n.a. 1,348 .659**.468*
Horsepower per person
employed in manufacturing 2.14 2.30 n.a. .154
Output per person employed
Manufacturing (value added)$1,204$1,492 •493**.453**
Wholesale trade (gross sales)20,26326,217.5l6**.519*4
Retail trade (gross sales) 4,157 5,820 .770*4.742*4
Agriculture (gross output) n.e. 466 .592**•479**
Value per hectare all farmland of
Crop & livestock production n.a.$31.3







Index Correlated with 1949






Value per hectare of cropland all
Crop production n.a.$113.3 .194
Fertilizer purchased $1.00 $2.80n.a.
Insecticides purchased 0.47 1.22n.a. .416*
Harvested output (kg/ha.)
Coffee 790 720 n.a.
Rice 1,390 1,250 n.a. .034
Potatoes 3,540 5,220 n.a. .289
Cotton (unginned) 440 630 n.a. .179
Corn 1,250 1,250 n.a. —.164
Sugar-cane (thousands) 26.9 36.1 n.a. .442*
Beans 630 550 n.a. .168
Percentage of pastureland in
planted pasture 13.9 42.7 n.a. .068
Milk production per cow milked
(liters per year) 484 621 n.a. .5204*
farm value
Land andbuildings $2,323 $5,247 .5884*
Livestock and machinery n.a. 2,515 .209









Land per farm worker
(hectares)
All farmland 25.5 14.9 —.251
Cropland 2.10 3.34.110 .259
Cropland and pasture 13.9 10.1 .233
Capital per farm worker
Land and buildings $527 $911
Vehicles and workstock 32 48 .344 703*4

















Source: Brazil's General Censuses of 1940 and 1950.
aThestatisticalsignificance of the correlation coefficients is
indicated at the I per cent level (**) and 5 per cent level (*).
bNationaland state average for each index. Units as indicated
exceptallvalues are in U.S. dollars, converted at the rate of 30
Cruzeiros per dollar.
higher percentage of foreign-born population (TV .646 **) was prob-
ably also an asset in both the urban and rural sectors, since this element
of the population could be expected to bring with it levels of education,
skills, and motivation above those of the native-born population.
It is clear that, as late as 1949—50, the average manufacturing estab-
lishment in São Paulo was relatively small scale and the average agri-
cultural establishment (at least in number of workers) fairly large scale.
However, the size of establishment—whether measured by number of
workers, capital, or output—in São Paulo's more industrialized zones,
was on the average greater not only in manufacturing and in retail and
wholesale trade, but also (although to a somewhat lesser degree) in
agriculture as well. The advantage of the industrial zones in average size
of establishment did tend to decline in most instances during 1940—50,
notably in agriculture. The principal exception was manufacturing, in
which establishment size as measured by capital and output (but not
Index Correlated with 1949







Crop production n.a.$378 .550**•445*
Milk and egg production n.a. 37 n.a. .411*
Animal production n.a. 51 n.a. —.135
Rural dwellers per room
(average) 1.23 1.17 n.a.
Rural housing amenities;
percentage with
Electric lights 1.4 3.9 n.a. .685**
Piped water 3.6 12.7 n.a. .781**








number of workers) was relatively larger in the more industrialized VI
zones in 1950 than in 1940, suggesting some shift toward more capi-
tal-intensive types of manufacturing. However, if we look at capital per h
worker, we find that a moderately higher value had prevailed in 1940 Ii
in manufacturing in the more industrialized zones, but that this dif- a
ference had disappeared by 1950, a finding confirmed by the alterna-
tive physical measure of motive force (horsepower) per manufacturing th'
worker. In contrast, capital per worker was significantly higher in the th
industrial zones not only in wholesale and retail trade but also in agri-
culture (TV .615 **).Thislead in capital per worker had strengthened
in retail trade although it had weakened in agriculture during 1940—SO. d
Nonetheless in 1950 as well as in 1940, labor productivity (output per w
worker) was significantly higher in the manufacturing sector of the
more industrialized zones, perhaps because of their greater human
capital. The same was true in wholesale and retail trade and in agricul- (
ture (TV .525 **),althoughthe productivity advantage of agriculture p
in the more industrialized zones weakened somewhat during 1940—SO. b
The fact that the zones of greater industrial-urban development gen- ti
erally enjoyed larger capital resources (and higher labor productivity)
undoubtedly reflects their large debt to the earlier successful develop- tid-
mentof nearby agriculture. The agricultural sector in turn had benefited
from the availability of more capital resources (probably on more
favorable terms as well) consequent on the proximity of the growing in- v
dustrial-urban centers. That the agriculture of São Paulo's more in-
dustrialized zones did benefit is supported by most of the remaining,
more detailed indexes presented in Table 3.
First, the more industrialized zones had a significantly higher value
of output per hectare of all farmland. This was reflected (along with
the stronger nonagricultural demand for land) in higher per hectare tli
farmland values. The same zones also had a higher value of crop pro-
duction per hectare of cropland, although the lead was less pronounced sll
than was the case for all farmland. This relationship was due partly to
the fact that, while still at very low levels, the per hectare expenditures 1i1
for fertilizer (TV .445 *forall farmland) and insecticides were signifi- Cf
cantlyhigher in the more industrialized zones. Even so, the soils in the
latter had been heavily depleted in the westward march of coffee in the
state, a depletion still reflected in their significantly lower coffee yields
in 1950. The yields of sugar-cane (which was being produced in São
Paulo by the most modern techniques) and to a lesser extent of potatoes
(much of which crop was produced by relatively techniques,
particularly in conjunction with irrigated rice production in the Paralba 9r
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Valley), did tend to be higher in the more industrialized zones. In rice,
cotton, corn, and bean yields, however, these zones were no more than
per holding their own in 1950—although this was no mean achievement in
light of the virgin tracts just then coming under cultivation in the highly
agricultural western frontier zones. However, in view of more recent
ia- improvements in techniques (particularly in irrigated rice and cotton),
ing the more industrialized zones may have shown a relative advantage in
the these latter crops by 1960.
Second, in value of livestock production per hectare of pastureland,
ied the more industrialized zones had a relative advantage only in milk pro-
50. duction. While the state of São Paulo had by 1950 already gone a long
per way in substituting more productive planted pastures for low-quality
the natural pastures, there was no significant difference between the more
•tan and less industrialized zones in the proportion of planted pastures or
ul- (as we saw earlier) in the number of cattle per thousand hectares of
ire pasture. However, in the light of their greater investment in the dairy
•50. breeds (primarily Holstein) and greater amounts of purchased feed ra-
tions in response to a growing urban demand for milk, the more in-
:y) dustrialized zones did have a strong relative advantage in milk produc-
tion per cow milked and in milk production per thousand hectares of
ted pastureland.
re Third, for the average farm of the more industrialized zones, in-
-in- vestment in both real estate (land and buildings) and nonreal estate
in- (livestock and machinery) was significantly greater than for the aver-
age farm in the less industrialized zones (TV .711 **forreal estate
capital). However, both relationships weakened during 1940—50, sug-
•ue gesting that the relative increase in land values and nonreal estate on the
ith recently settled agricultural frontiers was at least temporarily outpacing
ire that in the older agriculture of the more industrialized zones. The weak-
0- ening of the second relationship was especially marked—the relation-
-ed ship was no longer significant in 1950—although this change may to
to some extent reflect the fact that our efforts to estimate the value of
livestock (not reported by the 1950 census) were not sufficiently ac-
ifi- curate. The average farm of the more industrialized zones did, however,
produce a greater value of both crops and livestock—although with the
he latter most of the value was apparently derived from the livestock
lds products (milk and eggs) rather than from the sale of the animals. This
ao relationship was somewhat less strong in 1950, perhaps again because
es of inaccuracies in our estimates of gross value of production (particu-
larly of animals) based on the physical data (excluding values) of the
1950 census.
Ir
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More important, although subject to the same errors of estimation a
for 1950, were the resources and output of the average farm worker ai
in the several zones. In 1940, the physical land resources that the aver- 0
agefarm worker had to work with were not significantly different in a
the industrialized and nonindustrialized zones. By 1950, however, there
was distinctly less total farmland per worker in the more industrialized
zones. Nevertheless, perhaps because of increasing intensity of land
use and the increasing substitution of animal and mechanical power for
labor, the average farm worker in these zones actually had more crop p
and total productive (crop and pasture) land to work with in 1950,
by which time this relationship had become highly significant. In value
terms, however, the more industrial zones showed more real estate
investment per farm worker, a pronounced lead that was almost the P
same in 1940. While the more industrialized zones also showed a 1
moderately greater nonreal estate investment in 1940, this lead had b
disappeared by 1950, largely because of the(estimated)livestock 1
components. Nonetheless, both in 1940 and 1950, there was significantly r
morefarm (field and stationary) machinery per worker in the more in-
dustrialized zones, although there was some decline in the latter's ad-
vantage during the decade as farm mechanization spread to the zones of
lesser industrialization. In per worker investment in vehicles and work til
animals,on the other hand, the superiority of the more industrialized
zones became distinctly greater during 1940—50, undoubtedly because
of their earlier use of motor trucks, facilitated in turn by somewhat
better highways and mechanical service facilities. Finally, the superiority
in crop production per farm worker in the industrialized zones, while n
somewhat weaker than in 1940, was still moderately strong in 1950
as was per worker production of milk and eggs. Once again, however,
per worker income from animal production (assuming our estimates
were accurate) in these zones was not significantly different from that
of the more rural-agricultural zones.
Our last indexes of capital investment relate to housing. Housing is sI
usuallya consumption good under urban conditions. However with
production and family living more closely interrelated in the rural sector,
housing (particularly worker housing) is considered a "nonproductive"
part of agricultural investment. While São Paulo's rural housing was in
general not only more crowded but also lacking in the amenities of
modern life, the rural (like the urban) housing was significantly better Pt
in the more industrialized zones. Thus, in 1950 rural housing, as meas-
ured by the average number of persons per room in the more industrial
zones, was significantlyless crowded. (In urban housing, no such
Sn
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advantage existed.) The rural domiciles of the more industrial zones
also showed (despite small absolute differences)a strong superiority
over the less industrialized zones in extent of piped water, electric lights,
and toilet facilities (TV .729 ** forrural level of living index).
Our findings from analyses of the impact of industrial-urban de-
velopment on agriculture, via the local capital markets, in the Tennessee
Valley and the State of São Paulo were surprisingly similar for both
areas. However, one important difference should be noted. In São
Paulo, the per worker value of farm capital was less closely related to
industrial development in 1950 than in 1940, whereas in the Tennessee
Valley the comparable coefficient steadily increased from 1900 to 1950,
the period in which most of its industrial-urban growth took place.
• Perhaps this difference is largely attributable to the fact that, during
• 1900—50, both capital and labor flows in the Tennessee Valley were
between the rural and urban sectors, while in São Paulo as late as
1940—50 they were in considerable part from the older to the newer
rural zones. (During 1890—1910, our Tennessee Valley study area did
• experience a somewhat similar phenomenon. Some of its most rural
• counties temporarily prospered and attracted considerable in-migration
• on the basis of lumbering and coal-mining, a process about as exploita-
tive as that more recently followed by the expansion of agriculture in
São Paulo's western frontier zones.) Such cross-currents in factor flows
within São Paulo tended to obscure the rural-urban relationships. Part
of the reason for this lies in the fact that agricultural settlement had
only been completed recently. In the Tennessee Valley where the settle-
ment process had long since ceased, these relationships had become
more clearly drawn. With the settlement completed as of about 1950,
it seems reasonable to expect that the influence of industrialization
on agriculture in São Paulo will approach more closely to that already
observed in the Tennessee Valley, even with the antiemployment bias
of the artificially stimulated industrialization that became a factor in
São Paulo after 1950.
Industrialization and the Local Labor Market
Finally, let us consider those indexes most closely related to local labor
f resources and to the efficiency of the local labor market in relieving the
•r problem of low agricultural incomes and low farm-labor productivity by
•- facilitatingthe transfer of excess farm labor resources to nonagricultural
•I employment. Most of these indexes are presented in Table 4, although
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in Table 3 could just as appropriately have been placed in Table 4.
Where there is such an overlap, such as in capital per worker, the pre-
vious entry was concerned with factors affecting the numerator of the
index, whereas we are here concerned with the factors affecting the
denominator.
In Table 4, we first find that the more industrialized zones (as meas-
ured by 1949 per capita value added) were also far more urban and
less rural (TV .806 **and—.806 **),withfar higher population
densities (TV .748 **)•Theyalso had far higher per capita whole-
sale and retail sales (TV .651 **and.818 **)althoughtheir advantage
in these indexes weakened somewhat during 1940—50, especially in
wholesale trade. (The latter trend is more easily understood in the r
light of the fact that in São Paulo farm products accounted for 39 per
cent of wholesale sales and food products for 18 per cent more. Much
of the wholesale trade, therefore, involved the assembly of agricultural
products in the more rural areas.) Nonetheless, during 1940—SO, the
more industrialized zones not only greatly strengthened their lead in
percentage of male workers in the secondary (manufacturing and con-
struction) industries (TV .938 **), butalso further strengthened their
lead in employment in the tertiary (service) industries, with the sub-
group "commodity trade" showing the greatest increase (from .682 **
to.783 **).Atthe same time, of course, the more industrialized zones
showed relatively fewer males gainfully employed in the primary (agri-
cultural and extractive) industries (TV —.788**), arelationship that
was strongly marked and increasing.
Reflecting their generally higher labor productivity (Table 3 above),
the more industrialized zones also had significantly higher annual wages
per worker in all nonagricultural employment and in manufacturing
(TV .802 **),butagain this lead was weaker in 1950 than 1940. Fe-
male participation in the labor force was also considerably higher in the
industrialized zones in terms ofall employment and manufacturing
(TV .905 **and.460 **),althoughin agricultural employment, these
zones had relatively lower female participation. In educational achieve-
ment, in terms not only of completion of primary school (Table 3) but
also completion of the middle school (TV .708 **)anduniversity
courses as well, these zones also enjoyed higher indexes. With a pre-
dominantly white population in the state as a whole, São Paulo had a
moderately larger (relatively) white population (TV —.325)in 1940,
but this factor disappeared during 1940—50.
As noted earlier in (Table 3), the more industrialized zones also led
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TABLE 4
Population and Labor Market, Brazil and Sao Paulo: Selected indexes
with Comparisons between the National and State Averages, 1949—50,
and with Coefficients of Rank Correlation between These indexes and
1949 Per Capita Value Added by Manufacture for Twenty-three Zones




Index Correlated with 1949





Per capita value added by
Manufacture $35.3 $94.4.922**
Wholesale sales 74.3 166.6 •$73**.719**
Retail sales 61.4 111.8 .848**.810**
Residential classification of
population; percentage
Urban 25.0 39.9 .910.**.928**
Suburban 11.2 12.7 .469* .515**
Rural 63.8 47.4 .890**
Population density per sq. km. 6.1 37.0 .786**.742**
Percentage of gainfully
employed males in
Primary industries 65.8 47.8
Secondary industries 13.7 22.6 .872**
Tertiary industries 20.2 29.5 .727** .748**
Per worker annual earnings in
Manufacturing (nonadmin.) $350.4$404.9 .679**.550**
Wholesale trade (nonadmin.) 678.9 785.8 .666**.103
Retail trade (nonadmin.) 278.6 327.2 •737**.572**
All nonagricultural (all) 307.7 437.7.892**.719**
Percentage of male population
of 10+ completed
Middle school 2.74 4.78 n.a. .800**
University 0.80 1.20 n.a. .724**
Females as percentage of
labor force in
Manufacturing 16.3 21.2 n.a. .658**
Agriculture 26.5 21.4 .302
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TABLE 4 (continued) r
.
IndexCorrelated with 1949







White 61.7 85.6 395* .198
Italian n.a. 3.0 .782** n.a.
Portuguese n.a. 2.2 .586** n.a.
Spanish n.a. 1.7 .649** n.a.
German n.a. 0.5 .210 n.a.
Japanese n.a. 1.8 -.073 n.a.
Percentage of population
by religion
All Noncatholics 6.5 9.3 n.a. —.223
Protestant 3.3 3.5 n.a. —.187
Spiritualist 1.6 2.7 n.a. .158
Jewish 0.1 0.3 n.a. .671**
Orthodox 0.1 0.3 n.a. .529**
Moslem 0.01 0.02 n.a. .090
Buddhist 0.3 1.4 n.a. —.144
Female fertility
Twelve and over, bearing
children
Percentage bearing
live children n.a. 55.9 n.a.
Average number children
per mother n.a. 5.1 .211 n.a.
Percentage of total male
population in age range 0—416.4 14.6
Crude birth rate 43.7 31.8
Crude death rate 20.6 14.3
Crude natural increase 23.1 17.5 —.137 —.140
Net immigration rate, 1940—50n.a. +6.7 n.a. —.116
Rate of population growth,
1940—50 126.0 127.3 — .035
Population, all ages; male —
fern ale ratio
Nationwide 99.3 103.6 —.2 13 —.290
Rural 104.1 111.7 n.a. .253
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TABLE 4 (concluded)
Rank Correlation
Index Correlated with 1949






Male-female ratio 96.4 105.7-.109 n.a.
Percentage of male
population 28.7 31.0 .307 n.a.
Percentage of female
population 29.6 30.7 n.a.
Population, age range
40—59
Male-female ratio 107.0 116.1—.265 n.a.
Percentage of male
population 13.8 14.4—.047 n.a.
Percentage of female
population 12.8 13.0 .056 n.a.
Source: Brazil's General Censuses of 1940 and 1950 and various
federal and state publications on vital statistics.
aThestatistical significance ofthecorrelation coefficients is
indicated at theIper cent level and the 5 per cent level (*).
bNationaland state average for each index. Units as indicated
except all values in U.s. dollars, converted at the rate of 30 Cruzeiros
to the dollar.
differences by nationality. In 1940 these zones had relatively the largest
numbers of people of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese birth, but their
percentages of Japanese- and German-born population were not signifi-
cantly different. The Italian-born population has been particularly out-
standing in the development of the city of São Paulo. The Portuguese-
and Japanese-born have shown a stronger preference for agriculture, and
are prominent in such small-scale operations as fruit and vegetable grow-
ing near the major cities. Lately the Japanese have been moving in
increasing numbers into the urban centers or have joined the Syrian-
Lebanese to become one of the two major ethnic groups participating in
the assembly and first processing of farm products in the more rural
zones. Comparable data at the local level were not available in 1950,
although data on religious preference in the latter year (despite the
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ish) are a partial substitute. While there is some evidence 31thatBrazil's
small Protestant minority has as a group, attitudes more favorable to
hard work and thrift than the predominant Catholic population, São
Paulo's more industrial zones if anything tended to have relatively fewer
Protestants and noncatholics. As for other religious minorities, the more
industrial zones showed a significantly larger (relatively) population of
the Jewish and Orthodox faiths (the latter including most of the Syrian-
Lebanese), but no significant differences in relative numbers of Mos-
lems (Syrian-Lebanese) and Buddhists (Japanese). In the Tennessee
Valley, the Presbyterians and Quakers played a leading role in local
industrial development.
More important for present purposes are the various rather fragmen-
tary indexes of vital statistics, migration, and age-sex distribution that
• are presented in Table 4. First, we observe that as early as 1940 São
Paulo's more industrialized zones had much fewer females (relatively)
who had borne one or more live children (TV —.620**).Whilethis
• index perhaps reflects a later age of marriage and higher incidence of
spinsterhood,it was not matched by longer run lower fertility rates,
since the average number of children per mother (TV —.762**) was
if anything higher in the more industrialized zones. That the latter index
was not very reliable for São Paulo is suggested by the fact that the
percentage of the total (male) population in the age class 0—4 was
lower to a marked degree in the more industrial zones in 1940 and (to
a somewhat lesser degree) in 1950 as well (TV —.549 **).Thelatter
relationship is further confirmed by the finding that the crude birth rate
for 1939—42, after adjustment for underregistration of births, was sig-
nificantly lower in the more industrialized zones, a tendency that was
further strengthened for the decade as a whole (1940—50 average).
However, since the crude death rates (unadjusted) for the same dates
were also lower to a marked degree in the more industrialized zones,
the effect on the crude rate of natural increase was such that in neither
period did the industrial zones tend to have significantly lower rates of
natural increase (TV —.605 ** in 1940).
While the state of São Paulo's net in-migration during 1940—50
amounted to 6.7 per cent of its average population of that decade, it is
curious to learn that the net in-migration rate or rate of population
growth (TV .842 ** and .735 **) of the state's zones of greater indus-
31ErnilioWillems, "Protestantism as a Factor of Culture Change in Brazil,"
Econ.Dcv. andCultural Change, Vol. III (1955); and "Protestantism and Cul-
ture Change in Brazil and Chile," in W. V. D'Antonio and F. B.Pike (ed.),
Religion,Revolution, and Reform: New Forces for Change in Latin America,
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s trialization did not differ significantly from those of lesser industrializa-
o tion. Clearly the growth of the urban population of São Paulo (largely in
o its industrial zones) during 1940—50 required a substantial rate of net in-
migration. It is possible that much of this was short-distance (intrazonal)
e rural-urban migration. At the same time much of the interstate move-
if ment was probably rural-to-rural, attracted by the state's rapidly devel-
1- apingagricultural frontier areas. In any case, given the peculiar circum-
stance of uncompleted agricultural settlement, the less industrialized
zones still tended to have net in-migration rates comparable to those of
11 the zones of greater industrial-urban development.
To what extent were these migratory movements sex- or age-selective?
For São Paulo as a whole, the male-female ratio for the population of
it all ages in 1950 indicates that the rural areas with net in-migration had
o gained relatively more males and those having net outinigration had lost
) relativelyfewer males, while the net in-migration to urban areas had in-
is volved relatively more females. Among our twenty-three zones within
São Paulo, however, the rural population of the more industrial zones
3, had relatively more males, but this factor was so moderate as to be
IS statistically nonsignificant, while there was virtually no difference in male-
X female ratios in the urban populations of the more and less industrialized
zones. If alternatively we look at the 1940 population in the age range
iS 20—39 (the most productive), the indication is that earlier in-migration
° to the state had been slightly male-selective, but that within the state
• there was no difference in terms of the male-female index between the
:e zones of greater and lesser industrialization.
However, the more industrialized zones showed a moderately higher
percentage of their total male population—and a significantly larger pop-
ulation (relatively) of females—in the 20—39 age range, suggesting that
for these zones previous in-migration had been age-selective for both
sexes. This means that the more industrialized zones had tended to
.r attract from the less industrialized (or from other states at a rate higher
than the less industrialized) both males and females as they reached
0
' adulthood.(The comparable relationships found in the Tennessee Val-
is
ley——.746 **,.788**,and.878 respectively—weremuch stronger,
however.) For the age-class 40—59, however, the relative male and fe-
male populations did not differ between the zones of greater and lesser
industrial development. The more industrialized zones did, however,
show lower male-female ratios, which suggests that (insofar as not at-
tributable to higher life expectancy among women who have survived
2, thechild-bearing years) still earlier in-migration had brought relatively
more females.
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Let us return for a moment to the two indexes that are most important
to the present analysis: per worker farm capital and farm output. We
have already noted that in 1950 São Paulo's more industrialized zones
enjoyed higher per worker farm capital (.468 *) and higher per worker
farm output (.479 **) thandid the less industrialized—results similar
to those (.468 *and.479 **)found in our study of the Tennessee
Valley. Thanks to the longer historical span of the earlier study and the
existence of a control group, we could with more or less certainty trace
a cause-and-effect relationship (at least for 1900—50) in which indus-
trial-urban growth influenced agricultural development by improving the
efficiency with which the capital, labor, and product markets functioned.
While the degree of association between industrialization and the agri-
cultural indexes in São Paulo was approximately the same, it is not yet
possible to assess cause and effect with similar ease on the basis of a
single decade.
Furthermore, an improvement in per worker farm capital or per
worker farm output can come about through increased capital or more
remunerative product markets (the numerator) or through a reduction
in the farm labor force (the denominator), or all in combination. While
the Tennessee Valley area experienced all three types of adjustments,
the most important undoubtedly was the reduction in the size of the labor
force, both through local occupational shifts and outmigration and a
through the declining fertility rates associated with urbanization. In São
Paulo, while similar adjustments of a substantial nature were also cvi-
dent, as yet none of these latter indexes of labor adjustment has been as
closely related to industrial-urban development as in the Tennessee
Valley. In part, this result probably reflects a greater efficiency in the
operation of the national labor market in the U.S. and the existence in
this country of more adequate nonfarm job opportunities (because of
which, even the Tennessee Valley study area suffered as a whole consid-
erable net outmigration) than in Brazil. Furthermore, unlike the Ten- vj
nesseeValley, São Paulo is itself the mecca in which most of the nation's tll
surplus farm population must be absorbed. The above result, how-
ever,is probably attributable in much greater part to the fact that
São Paulo's expansion of nonagricultural employment was in 1950 al
still far from sufficient to absorb the large rural surplus, while its own p!
agricultural frontiers (and those in neighboring states) were, still capable
of attracting much of the surplus population of the older agricultural
regions. The fact that the differential advantage of São Paulo's more
industrialized zones in per worker farm capital and output weakened
substantially between 1940 and 1950 undoubtedly reflects the competi- a'
tion from this agricultural frontier which, despite its lack of industrial-r
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in urbandevelopment, offered sound inducement to, and attracted consid-
Ve erable amounts of, not only labor but also capital in purely agricultural
es development.
:er The comparable, largely agricultural counties of the Tennessee Valley
(being much older) were clearly overpopulated by 1950. These counties
ee needed even higher outmigration rates as well as substantial outside
be capital if their small-scale, labor-intensive farms were to be reorganized
ce on a more productive basis. Undoubtedly, some of São Paulo's older
is- zones were facing a similar problem insofar as they had lagged behind
be other zones in industrial-urban development. But, with the old and new
agricultural zones grouped indiscriminately in our analysis under the
heading, "less industrialized," the effects of industrial-urban development
let on agricultural incomes and productivity—particularly on such important
a population characteristics as fertility rates, migration rates, and age-sex
structure-.---were considerably obscured for the decade 1940—SO. That
er our results were nonetheless so similar during that period for São Paulo
ire and the Tennessee Valley, despite such important differences in circum-
on stances, underlines the importance of further industrial-urban develop-
ile ment as a factor in transforming Brazilian agriculture. As settlement of
.ts, the frontier zones is completed in the states of Paraná, Mato Grosso,
and Goias—as it has been in São Paulo since 1950—conditions will
nd approach more closely to those in which the Tennessee Valley found
flo itself several decades earlier. It will then become more evident that even
vi- these new areas cannot, without industrial-urban development of their
as own, avoid the rural overpopulation and the agricultural undercapital-
;ee ization that already plague the northeast and other older and stagnant




We may conclude from this analysis of São Paulo that (abstracting from
n's the countereffects of an agricultural frontier that has not yet disap-
w- peared), local industrial-urban development—by facilitating the flow of
capital into, and the flow of labor out of, agriculture—had by 1950,
50 already exercised an important influence in raising the incomes and
wn productivity of nearby farmers—an influence that has probably been
•ble considerably strengthened during the subsequent eighteen years.
ral On the capital side, São Paulo's industrial-urban development during
re the 1950's increased personal incomes and savings, thereby raising the
•ted total resources of the local banking and, credit institutions, while creating
a greater demand for income-elastic foods and other consumer goods.
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tated investments in land improvement, the development of more profit-
able capital-intensive enterprises (particularly milk, poultry and eggs,
and specialty crops), the raising of capital-labor ratios, and an increased
scale of farming operations—all of which increased farm output and
incomes per worker relative to those in the (older) zones of lesser indus-
trial-urban development. The nearby agriculture also benefited from the
favorable effects of increasing population density and of the expanding
tax base within the urban-oriented infrastructure, which improved both
the quantity and quality of electricity, railroads and highways, education,
and health facilities available to the nearby rural people.
On the labor side, the productivity of farm labor was raised by nearby
industrial-urban development, not only because of concomitant higher
rates of capital formation in agriculture, but also because of the greater f.
facility with which excess farm labor could move into higher-income,
nonfarm employment. Furthermore, farms located near industrial-urban
centers could use the labor that remained in agriculture more produc-
tively. Thanks to their greater access to nonreal estate capital and to
more favorable markets for local products, they could concentrate on c
more land- and capital-intensive products that utilized farm labor more
fully, with a resultant rise in productivity that sufficed to cover the now d
higheropportunity cost of farm labor as determined by nonfarm wage f4
levels, a
In all probability all of these effects strengthened after 1950, but it is
likely that they did so at a slower pace than they might have, given the
9
shortcomingsof public policy, in particular the government's alloca-
tion of the real resources that it succeeded in capturing through its
system of multiple-exchange rates and its inflation-derived forced-savings
policy of 1953—64. We shall conclude this paper with a brief and some-
what speculative appraisal of how Brazilian agriculture fared under the al
national public policies of this more recent period.
tI
BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT




Relative to Brazilian agriculture generally, the agriculture of Sâo Paulo
must have gained most (or suffered least) from the official policy of
forced-draft acceleration of the growth of the industrial sector during re7
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1953—64.Clearly, the state of São Paulo was the major beneficiary of
the resources that the government allocated to industrial development.
d To a lesser extent the state also benefited differentially from the resources
d diverted to subsidized imports of tractors (discontinued in 1960 in favor
of a domestic tractor industry), fuels, and fertilizers (discontinued in
e 1964) and to coffee price-supports. The farmers of São Paulo therefore
g must have received substantial direct and indirect benefits from the new
h policies, primarily through the resultant favorable effects on the urban
demand for farm and food products.
From a financial point of view, however, these benefits were rather
y ephemeral and, from the standpoint of encouraging fundamental resource
adjustments and increased efficiency in agriculture, were even less satis-
factory. This was because of the unfavorable effects of public policy
on employment. First, the particular capital-intensive industries that were
n promoted kept farm wages relatively low even in the more industrial
zones, as in-migration outran remunerative nonfarm job opportunities.
o Second, the heavy import subsidies in effect for a time on certain agri-
o cultural inputs favored excessive mechanization. This mechanization re-
ceived further stimulus from the tendency to invest agricultural savings
w (apart from those put into agricultural land, driving up land values) in
farm machinery as a convenient hedge against inflation. This is scarcely
a useful practice from the standpoint of optimum allocation of resources.
is To be sure, the perceptive farm manager could detect that the terms
of (insofar as middlemen were not capturing the benefits) were
turning in his favor, particularly in the livestock-products sector, and
many began to shift their resources accordingly. Unfortunately, however,
these improved terms of trade reflected the government's continued neg-
lect of agriculture, a neglect that took the form of insufficient and badly
administered agricultural credit, research, and extension services. The
coffee price-support policy was not an effective substitute. It did help to
spread some of the benefits of economic growth to São Paulo's less indus-
• trialized frontier zones and to a much greater degree to the northern
• section of the state of Paraná. While it may have stimulated industrial
development in these areas, the coffee price support policy may also have
been biased against employment in agriculture, insofar as coffee land
was diverted to planted pasture under the stimulus of changing relative
prices, public production-control measures, and most of all, unfavorable
weather. In any case, if the resources allocated to the coffee price sup-
•0 portpolicy had been devoted to improved agricultural services, many
more improvements in the allocation of agricultural resources would have
resultedthan actually did.
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Lacking these improvements, São Paulo's agriculture has since 1950
made far less progress in raising its productivity, particularly in the far
more complex and less familiar livestock sector, than it might otherwise r
have done. Livestock and livestock products are income elastic. For most a
producers laboring under inefficient production techniques, higher rela-
tive prices did not mean greatly increased profits. Therefore the supply
of such income-elastic products was much less price-elastic than it should c
have been, while the supply schedule was shifting downward slowly if
at all. This problem was further compounded by the increasing resort v
to consumer food-price controls as an anti-inflation measure while the (
pricesof important agricultural inputs (upon the increased purchase of
which, modernization of the livestock industries so much depended) rose c
unrestrained. The recent end to subsidies on fuel and fertilizer imports
(an anti-inflation measure) and the increasing abandonment of cheap
foreign sources of other major agricultural inputs in favor of strongly
protected domertic sources have also increased the difficulties of trans- u
forming and modernizing Brazil's still relatively backward agriculture as b
well as of promoting the spread of mechanization insofar as this is eco- a
nomic at still low farm wage rates. (In fact mechanization was already
economically justifiable with the price structure that prevailed in 1963,
at least in some areas of southern Brazil.)
Our emphasis on the livestock rather than the crop sector of Brazilian
agriculture may appear excessive, in view of the fact that the Brazilian
diet still depen4s predominantly on food products of vegetable origin.
Furthermore, crop production in Brazil (including most of São Paulo)
is still largely based on technically backward methods. The generally low
physical crop yields have, if anything, tended to decline, insofar as the
initially high yields of virgin land on the frontiers have failed to offset
the declining yields in the older agricultural areas, which have lagged a
in increasing their use of fertilizer, improved seeds, insecticides, and
other modern agricultural inputs. However, to an increasing extent—
even in the northeast—I have found that farmers are not only profit-
motivated, but are also eager to accept such improved techniques if they
have adequate technical assistance in their effective use and if the relative
prices of farm products and purchased inputs make such improvements
pay financially. In any case, since 1950 agricultural progress has enabled
food-crop output to expand at a rate sufficient at least to maintain con-
stant (though not lower) relative prices to urban consumers. Even this
was a relatively satisfactory performance, considering the fact that Brazil's
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60, while the urban population was expanding at 5.4 per cent per year.
Thus far, this achievement in the crop sector probably owes more to
relatively elastic supply functions for the major staple crops, given an
abundance of cropland, than to higher productivity. Furthermore, on
the demand side, the pressures of urban population growth have been
less strongly augmented by the additional element of income elasticity
of demand. Of the traditional staple foods of vegetable origin, those for
which the highest elasticities in the urban sector were found in 1962—63
were products of wheat (0.36)—of necessity largely imported—and rice
(0.21). Beans, corn meal, and manioc flour had elasticities close to zero.
(Relative to the rural sector, the urban sector had a much higher per
capita consumption of wheat and potatoes, a slightly smaller consump-
don of rice, and a far smaller consumption of beans, corn, and manioc;
the urban sector also consumed more oranges and vegetable oils per
capita but less sugar and bananas.) The only vegetable products with
urban income elasticities higher than wheat (0.36) were oranges and
bananas (0.64—0.74), vegetable oils (0.55), and potatoes, margarine,
and manioc root (0.40—0.48); the only livestock products with elastici-
ties less than wheat were powdered milk (0.35),sundriedbeef (0.15),
lard (0.08), and salt pork (_0.04).32 Nonetheless, with the prospect of
32FundaçaoGetulio Vargas, Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Projecdes de
Ojertae Denianda de Produtos AgrIcolasparaoBrasil,Riode Janeiro, January
1966, pp. 37 and 44. Comparable data are also presented (p. 45) for the rural
sector (0.40 for all foods as compared with 0.55 in the urban sector). It isin-
teresting to note that, for most categories of food, the income elasticity of de-
mand was lower in the rural sector than the urban sector, suggesting (insofar as
the results do not reflect the greater difficulties of collecting the basic data) the
generally easier accessibility of the food supply to the lower-income rural popu-
lation. The only significant exceptions—elasticity higherintherural area—
were found for lard and salt pork (toucinho), rice 0.33, wheat products 0.41,
and potatoes 0.59. Except for potatoes, the rural elasticity was 0.50 or more only
for butter 1.09, cheese 0.68, eggs 0.57, and fresh beef and fresh milk 0.50 each.
Comparable data were also shown for three regions—the south, the east, and
the north-northeast——the ranges in elasticities for all foods being from 0.62 to
0.50 (urban) and from 0.44 to 0.36 (rural), with the north-northeast the highest
and the south lowest in both sectors. The urban north-northeast had the largest
number of foods with elasticities exceeding +1.0—cheese 2.33 and chickens 1.91;
wheat flour,margarine, and fresh pork1.23—1.39; and freshmilk, potatoes,
wheat pastes, oranges, and butter 1.00—1.10. Other high-ranking products were
eggs 0.95 and canned meats, powdered milk, bananas, fresh beef, and canned
fish 0.7 1—78. Only manioc flour had a negative elasticity —.10.The urban south
had a much shorterlistof products withelasticitiesgreaterthan + 1.0—
chickens 1.45, butter 1.26, cheese 1.11, and canned fish1.05; or between +0.7
and +1.0—pork 0.93, fresh fish 0.83, canned meats 0.81, and fresh beef 0.79;
while three of its products, lard, corn meal, and mariioc flour, had negative in-
come elasticities of —0.10 to —0.11.•
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continued rapid growth of the population, both total and urban, and
with the best agricultural land at last taken up, there is a growing neces-
1
sity(as well as an increasing economic opportunity) to modernize crop
production, particularly in the older and less remote agricultural regions.
Even more urgent, with the low price elasticities of demand for most
staple food products, is the expansion of storage facilities. Such facilities
permit the stabilization of crop supplies (and prices) for the benefit of
both farmers and consumers. If all these improvements are to come
about, the Brazilian government must commit substantially more re- e
sources to the public agricultural agencies serving the long-neglected
food-crop-producing sector than it heretofore has.
Even so, it is Brazil's livestock sector that stands in the greatest need
of stimulation and development, and, therefore, of public assistance. S
The fact that the relative prices of livestock products have increased I
substantially in recent years reflects both the technological backwardness
of the livestock sector and the evident desire of the urban consumer to f
substitute livestock products for cereals as his income rises. While geo- I
graphically the most widespread agricultural enterprise in Brazil, beef-
cattle production remains perhaps the most backward and traditional c
sector of agriculture. Even with its high degree of inefficiency, however, P
the Brazilian cattle industry has thus far managed to produce beef
cheaply enough to enable even the nation's poorest to eat much more
meat than most of the world's poor. Nonetheless, the rate of cattle
increase in Brazil was only half that of population growth during 1950—
60 in the face of very high income elasticities: 0.72 in the urban and
0.50 in the rural sector. While improved transportation probably in-
creased the proportion of fresh-beef output available in the urban centers,
r] these facts make it clear that a vast improvement in the efficiency of
cii beef production—through better breeding stock, more effective disease
The rural north-northeast (Brazil's poorest sector) had few products with in- P
come elasticities of +0.70 or higher (wheat flour 2.01, potatoes 1.80, butter 1.25, nj
and eggs 0.73) but a somewhat larger number between 0.50 and 1.00 (cheesi
and wheat bread 0.63; whole milk and wheat pastes 0.56—0.57; and rice, edible
manioc root, and salt pork 0.52—0.53). However,ithad the longestlistof
productswithnegative income elasticities.Barely negativewere beans and
vegetable oils ranging minus 0.01—0.03; slightly more negative were dried milk,
oranges, (dried) fish, and corn meal, minus 0.08—0.10; and highly negative were
the traditional sundried beef —0.72 and the crude plantation-produced staples
of the back-country sugar-cane industry, brown sugar cake —0.35 and aguardente
—1.13.For the rural south, only butter 1.03 and cheese 0.70 had elasticities
greater than +0.70; three between 0.50 and 0.70 (lard 0.68, fresh beef 0.59, and
brown-sugar cake 0.63); and only molasses and manioc flour had negative
elasticities, minus 0.16—0.17. 1r
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control,improved pastures,and more adequate foragecrops—is
urgent if prospective domestic demand is to be met. (Although it is
op generally regarded as unlikely that Brazil will become a significant cx-
porter of beef products in the foreseeable future, the country certainly
)st has the potential, given sufficiently radical improvement in the productive
jes efficiency of its huge cattle industry.)
of Needs and opportunities are also great in the production of milk,
ne poultry, and swine. Brazil's dairy industry faces very high urban income
elasticities for its milk products (cheese 1.38, butter 1.21, and fluid
ed milk 0.76) but, even in the major urban milkshects—where milk pro-
ducers are following many improved practices—annual production per
ed cow averages only about 2,500lbs.for animals with considerable Hol-
'e. stein blood and about 1,000 lbs. for Brahma (Zebu) animals. (The
•ed lowestranking U.S. states, Mississippi and Louisiana average about
3,400 lbs.) Brazil's poultry industry (facing income-elasticities of 1.31
for fowl and 0.70 for eggs)is,in general, even less well organized.
0- Finally,swine production (with a very favorable urban income elasticity
for pork)—despite much good Duroc stock, relatively good disease-
•a1 control practices, and good feeding practices—still requires per hundred
-'r pound,s of output (under the best conditions) 35 per cent more physical
input (in corn-equivalent), including the breeding stock, than U.S.
e farmers had achieved as early as 19 10—14. Yet, with a very large total
output of corn (whose yield has increased significantly in the south with
the rapid adoption of hybrid seed) and manioc—both of which have
income elasticities near zero or even negative in human consumption—
Brazil has a very good potential for achieving an efficient commercial
swine industry. In places where market opportunities exist, there is al-
• ready a surprisingly large number of milk, pork, and even poultry pro-
0 ducerswho are following many of the improved practices of their Amen-
se can counterparts. In general, however, the lack of adequate and reliable
public technical assistance, compels the Brazilian producers to tackle
managerial problems of enormous complexity on a purely empirical basis.
So long as such assistance continues lacking, the increasing desire of
of Brazil's urban consumers for these products will be frustrated by the
nd highly inelastic (and very slowly downward-shifting) supply schedules
• in these important industries.33
les For a detailed documentation of these matters, for crop as well as livestock
ite production, see the series of reports on seven major agricultural regions, now
ies being issued by the Graduate Center for Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt
•nd University. under the general title: William H. Nicholls and Ruy Miller Paiva,
•'ye J",Tinety-Ni,ieFazendas: The Structure and Productivity 01 Brazilian Agriculture,
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Toward an Integrated National Economy fl
While the close observer of Brazilian agriculture can find good reason si
to be critical of the backwardness of its production techniques, there is,
on balance, much reason to be optimistic, provided that the Brazilian
government does its part in lending agriculture a helping hand. Much of
S(
this optimism must rest on the progress that Brazil has made since 1940,
toward a single integrated market for farm products and agricultural
inputs. Thus far this movement has taken place primarily within the
midwest and southeast regions dominated by the development centers of
São Paulo and Rio, but today it is spreading over the northeast as well.
r What is perhaps most remarkable is that Brazil, despite the most
inadequate transportation and communication facilities, remained pout-
d
ically unified during the four centuries that elapsed before it began the
process of effective economic integration. This feat of preserving the in
consciousness of nationhood over so vast a territory bodes well for the
future of Brazil, since, of all Latin American countries, it has the greatest
potential (in terms of "extent of the market") for realizing the econo-
mies of large-scale manufacturing.
As we have already seen, this relatively modern phenomenon of inter-
nal economic integration began with the march of coffee westward from
Rio de Janeiro and through São Paulo, an expansion intimately bound
up with railway development. As railways were extended, large, highly-
capitalized and well-managed coffee plantations were established; mar-
keting and financial intermediaries emerged; and São Paulo's coffee ad
economy became well integrated into the national and even the world
economy through transportation, storage, and standardization facilities
which soon constituted a highly sophisticated marketing system. How-
ever, so thoroughly did coffee dominate the economy of southern Brazil au
that, in spite of indirect benefits from railway construction, food crops bd
and livestock products for the growing internal market lagged far behind
cOffee in the efficiency of their production and marketing. To be sure, inj
local assembling and processing firms were gradually developing along taj
the railways, but standardization of product was minimal, storage capac-
ity grossly inadequate, local transportation primitive, and the railroads
themselves woefully unsatisfactory, particularly for livestock and fresh
meat. As a consequence, in São Paulo and to a greater degree in the
rest of the south, there was much physical waste and little incentive for
expanding commercial farm production, while the prices of farm products ret
differed widely between regions and showed extreme fluctuations both
seasonally and year-to-year. ch
Sr
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Commerce between the south and north of Brazil was extremely dif-
ficult, relying almost exclusively on sea and river transportation. Coastal
shipping was inefficient and expensive and river transportation, by and
SOIl large confined to the Amazon Basin, was subject to seasonality in certain
iS, areas. These shortcomings made the northeast, which imports from
ian southern Brazil much of its wheat and rice and—in its frequent drought
of years beans, corn, and other staples—especially vulnerable to adversity.
40, Within the northeast, railways were less developed and integrated than
iral in the south, with most transportation between interior points by donkey
the trains and cattle drives, and between the coastal cities by sailboat. Certain
; of strategically located towns came to serve as the major central markets
'eli. receiving most of the farm products of the hinterland and then channel-
tost ing them into the major urban centers, these operations being con-
ilit- ducted in regular Street fairs.
the During the last two decades, however, this picture of a primitive and
the ineffective system of marketing has begun to change significantly, largely
the because of recent highway development and the rapid growth of truck
•test transportation. The transformation was, of course, most striking in the
no- south where it affected many sleepy old provincial towns within 100
miles of the city of São Paulo. Although they received their initial devel-
:er- opmental impetus from the railroad extending from that metropolis,
om these towns were nonetheless only tenuously integrated into the regional
•md economy until recently when they were linked to the state capital by
ily- major arteries, largely paved. While local farm-to-market roads remained
ar- underdeveloped, truck transportation grew in importance because of its
tee advantages in speed, flexibility, and reliability over the less costly but
rid poorly equipped and hopelessly administered public railway system.
,ies As a result of these improvements in transportation in conjunction
w- with burgeoning urban demand for food products, the southeast is fast
izil approaching the achievement of a well-integrated regional economy for
both food products and agricultural inputs. The independent truck owner-
nd operator has become Brazil's modern pioneer. He is introducing an
re, important new competitive element into the local assembling, transpor-
tation, and distribution of food products, while assuring farmers im-
ac- proved access to the important manufactured farm inputs that constitute
ids his return load. Along with the independent trucker, we have that other
remarkable catalyst in the modernization of agriculture in the southeast,
the the ubiquitous traveling salesman from São Paulo. Some of the most
valuable agricultural extension work in Brazil is being done by the sales
cts representatives of private firms as they push the sales of such products
as protein supplements, insecticides, vaccines and veterinary medicines,
chemical fertilizers, motors and pumps, and improved seeds.
jT.
372 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
In several southern states, a network of state agencies has been estab-
1
lished to supply farmers with seeds, vaccines, fertilizers, and other farm a•
supplies at subsidized prices. But despite their price advantages, these
1
agencies have not wrested the market from private firms, which continue
to compete on the basis of higher quality or better quality control.
(Except among the Japanese, agricultural cooperatives have played a
very minor role.) 1
Storage capacity for cereals (much of it public) has also been cx-
panded considerably in the southeast. But even apart from its frequent
diversion to accommodate coffee surpluses, this storage capacity still re- e
mains below desirable levels for purposes of supply and price stabiliza-
tion. Storage, grading, and standardization have been developed further s
for rice than for most other food products, but in general remain at an
inferiorstage, handicapping the development of price reporting, specifi- e
cation buying, warehouse warrants, commodity exchanges and futures 6
trading—devices essential to modern marketing and to the implementa-
tion of price support policies such as have long since been in effect in c
Brazil's coffee industry. Even so, considerable progress in cereal market- 2
ing has been underway in southern Brazil. With urban expansion, the
commercial production of perishable products has been growing up rap-
idly around the major cities. Chief among these products are milk, poul-
try and eggs, and fruits and vegetables. Indeed such areas as the Paralba
Valley (between the cities of Rio and São Paulo with excellent highway le
and railroad connections to both) are now undergoing the same kind of n
agricultural rehabilitation—with increasingly sophisticated marketing and Sq
productiontechniques—that New England experienced, as the increas-
ingly important advantages of favorable location gradually overcome the c
drawbacks of poor or incompletely recovered soils and unfavorable to-
pography. In such local processing operations as cotton-ginning and rice-
hulling, considerable excess capacity is now common. This encourages
local price agreements, which are especially hard on the small farmer
who does not have (as his large-owning neighbor often does) substantial
interests in such local commercial enterprises. Once again, however, the
growth of the trucker-buyer as a factor is probably having an ameliorative
effect on these local monopolies. At the retail level, neighborhood food ad
storescontinue to be small-scale, high-margin marketing units. They are,
however, subject to the competition of not only the traditional, primitive, toj;
ambulatory Street markets still popular even in Rio and São Paulo—a
competition still relatively severe because so many of the marketeers,
lacking better job opportunities, are willing to work for very low net
wages—but also of chain stores and supermarkets. The growth of theseri
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latter reflects the increasing number of automobiles and home refriger-
ators and even the slowly worsening scarcity of domestic servants in the
largest cities.
te Thus, it is clear that in São Paulo, for a half a century in the vanguard
1 of Brazilian industrial-urban development, the single integrated market
a for both farm commodities and farm inputs (including labor) began.
Today the extent of that market has spread beyond the borders of the
state, and with the cities of São Paulo and of Rio as its centers, has
at continued to expand, until it now embraces most of the southeast and
e- even much of the frontier midwest.
a- By 1964, with only 2.9 per cent of the national territory, the state of
er São Paulo had 18.8 per cent of the nation's mileage in public roads
(federal, state, and the equivalent of county) and the eight-state south-
east (as defined in Table 1), with 17.7 per cent of the land area, had
es 66.9 per cent of such roads, whose total extent was about 340,000 miles.
a- Over three-fourths of the nation's public roads were low-quality and
in casually maintained county roads but, even of these, São Paulo had
• 21.2 per cent and the southeast 70.2 per cent. These high figures reflect
he the greater density of rural populations in the southeast. Undoubtedly,
they also reflect the willingness of local political units in that part of the
ii- country to accept responsibility for land communications of a class
ba which, in much of the rest of Brazil, are ignored as mere "trails" and
ay left out of the statistics. Of the nation's 76,400 miles of federal and state
of roads—by far the most important for long-distance communication—
ad São Paulo had 10.7 per cent (of which, 37 per cent paved) and the
is- southeast 55.3 per cent (of which, 20 per cent paved). The 44.7 per
he cent remaining for the vast balance of the national area was only 9.1
:o- per cent paved.34 Even so, within the southeast region, it is already pos-
e- sible to drive on paved highways from the city of São Paulo (via Rio)
to Salvador in the northeast, to Brasilia to the north, almost to the
.er Uruguayan border to the south, to Maringá in the north of Paraná to
ial the southwest, and to several points on São Paulo's western borders for
he connections with roads serving the major agricultural regions in southern
ye Mato Grosso. The city of Rio is linked with this system via São Paulo
and also has all-paved connections with Salvador, Vitória, Belo Hori-
• re, zonte, and Brasilia. The importance of this recent highway development
ye, toregional economic integration can hardly be exaggerated.
—a Improved transportation is the principal instrument in the economic
• fusion that is beginning to take place between the north and northeast
iet These and subsequent highway statistics are computed from data presented
in Anudrio EstatIstico do Brasil, 1965, p. 246.
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(
and the dynamic southeast of Brazil. The 1940's saw the creation of one
of the world's oldest and most extensive networks of airways, bringing for stat
the first time the remotest corners of the nation into effective communi-
cation with the center. In 1960 came the nearly overnight creation of dcv
the new federal capital, Brasilia, in the interior. This undertaking was an sub
act of sheer economic madness from whose short-run fiscal and monetary des
consequences Brazil has still not fully recovered. From a broader his- and
torical perspective, however, the establishment of the new capital is prob- flo\
ably justified as a great integrative measure, of key importance in peopling tow
the nearly empty interior and in linking all parts of this continental —a
nation into a single economic entity. The most important short-run stin
benefit from Brasilia has been the initiation of the arterial highways SOd
needed to connect the city with the rest of Brazil. A new system was trat
constructed by paving old roads in the southeast and by blazing new
roads in the interior. Of the 14,400 miles of federal highways now open has
to traffic outside of the southeast, a large percentage owes its existence hay
to Brasilia. Of course, the establishment of a new capital was not logi- key
caily required for this highway construction. It is difficult, however, to and
imagine any other imperative for the rapid execution of this ambitious regi
program in a nation whose outlook isstill essentially coast oriented, has
While only about 10—12 per cent of these new federal highways are cro
paved, they are all-weather roads which are attracting a rapidly growing enti
volume of truck traffic. The consequence is that, with Brasilia tied to the
the major cities of the north and northeast, these regions are at last en- trW
joying effective land communication with São Paulo, Rio, and the whole
southeast as well.
The effects have already been remarkable. As the new federal high-
ways are being completed to the north, northeast, and west of Brasilia, ill
human settlement and the agricultural development of the hinterlands gio
are increasing apace. The manufactures and farm products of the south-
east are moving in large volume by truck to the northeast, and both of U
primary products and human migrants make up the return traffic. Many
forthe newer agricultural regions where hav4
farm labor is relatively scarce and well remunerated, and where well- (pa1
organized farm-labor markets exist to meet the joint needs of the mi-
grants, truckers, and agricultural employers. It is true that long-distance iarg
truck transportation, although highly competitive, isstill relatively ex-
pensive, especially for south-north traffic. Hence, improving the efficiency are
and lowering the cost of coastal shipping are essential to the process of of
national economic integration, and recently, significant efforts have been
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priatefor the railway system is more problematic—given its present sad
state and the huge capital outlay that creation of an effective and ef-
ficient system would require.) Even so, the beneficial effects of highway
development in the midwest, north and northeast have already been
substantial. Almost everywhere in Brazil, agricultural products of every
description have gained in value because of greater access to markets,
and a vast variety of consumer goods manufactured in the southeast are
now widely available in the street fairs and stores of the most remote
towns. In the northeast, the greater availability of manufactured products
—and the lower truck tariffs for return trips to the south—are a great
stimulus for the monetization and commercialization of agriculture. The
social benefits that have come from the cheap rubber-thong sandal and
transistor radio have also been substantial.
Within the north and northeast, the anticipation of improved roads
has created a transportation revolution even before the expectations
have been fulfilled. On the local level, trucks are rapidly displacing don-
keys, bringing such comparatively remote states as Maranhão, PiauI,
and the whole vast interior into effective communication with the major
regional capitals of Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, and Salvador. The result
has been growth in marketable surpluses of staple food products. While
crop and livestock production techniques remain primitive and almost
entirely manual, they are receiving a stimulus to modernization through
the spread of trucking. As part of the return loads brought back by
truckers, manufactured farm inputs as well as feed concentrates and
improved breeding stock are finding their way increasingly to the more
remote areas.
The prevailing structure of agriculture and land-tenure arrangements
in the northeast is to a great extent reflected in the structure of the re-
gion's local farm-product markets. Cattle production (and in the major
urban milksheds, milk production) are typically the principal interest
of the large landowners, who reserve most of the available pasturelands,
forage crops, and crop residues for their own account. Because they
have more capital and knowhow at their disposal, these large producers
(particularly when urban outlets for milk are good) are most likely to
improve their techniques in livestock production. In crop production—
largely delegated to tenant families (under varying arrangements) using
almost completely manual techniques—improved production practices
are seldom found, except where the landowner reserves a substantial part
of his cropland for direct operation with cash-wage labor, some mecha-
nization, and—although this is rare—somewhat better, purchased inputs.
By either system the large landowners concentrate rather considerableT
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quantities for sale. This produce comes more often from purchases of I
the tenant's product and from crop-shares received for the use of the c
plantation's own processing facilities (especially in sugar-cane and ma- t
nioc) than from explicit land rents, which in many cases in the northeast p
are surprisingly low. Thus they have substantial bargaining power both
in the acquisition and the sale of their produce. Today it is a common
practice for the landowners to truck their products, either to the nearest a
towns, in whose assembling and first-processing enterprises they often e
have a commercial interest, or (generally in hired trucks) direct to major t
urban markets. p
Small independent farmers, of which there are relatively few, in most e
regions, often depend on their large neighbors for facilities to process v
their produce as well as for its purchase or transportation. However, the t]
increasing prevalence of independent truckers or trucker-buyers is im- a
proving their bargaining power. Small farmers fortunate enough to live s
near major market towns usually sell directly in the large street fairs, a
bypassing the middleman at the cost of one or two days' absence from 1
their farms each week. In such areas small farmers are found in larger f
numbers, often with their own primitive processing equipment. (In cer-
tammore remote areas, where the alternative of occupying free public
lands still exists, many families prefer to work on large holdings. There
is a great complex of social as well as economic reasons for this, but
undoubtedly the small farmer's more limited access to market outlets and n
farm-processing equipment is a factor.) p
More generally, it is clear that the marketing structure of the north- h
east is inferior to that of the south. Its much greater dependence on SG
major street fairs reflects the comparative lack of standardization, a de-
ficiency that makes purchase by inspection mandatory. Processing facili- ti
ties are fewer, less efficient, and less competitive, and waste of byproducts p
is greater, particularly in cattle slaughter. In a region characterized by
frequent and often disastrous droughts, storage facilities are still quite
inadequate even for seasonal price stabilization. Fewer farmers have
easy access to the purchased farm inputs necessary to agricultural mod-
ernization. Frequently public agricultural services are inaccessible, mak-
ing efficient use of the inputs difficult or impossible, and even where
possible, too expensive for most farmers because low volume demand
for such inputs keeps their price up. Nonetheless, even within the
northeast, one can perceive at least the beginnings of regional (and
national) economic integration and a more efficient marketing system as G
transportation improvements and regional urban growth proceed apace. re.
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In addition, the increasing toll of outmigration has tended to unite the
the citizenry (including even the large landholders) of many provincial
na- towns in the necessity of local industrialization to keep their young
ast people at home.
Dth Finally, the federal government, both through the large regional devel-
)Ofl opment agency (SUDENE) and directly, is at last making a major effort,
rest administrative and financial, to improve the infrastructure of the north-
ten east, particularly its highways, education, and electric power. It is also
1jor trying to help the area catch up in the race for economic development,
promoting industrialization primarily through very generous income-tax
'ost exemptions to private enterprise for building new plants in this disad-
:esS vantaged region. The problems of establishing economically viable indus-
the trial plants in the northeast are still formidable, and one can easily find
rn- arguments against using scarce capital resources there, rather than in the
ive still only partially developed southeast. However, on balance, it would
irs, appear that the time has arrived for the southeast to be thrown back
•orn largely upon its own resources (except that public support of measures
ger for raising its agricultural productivity should continue, with readjust-
er- ments for better balance). Undeniably, the policy of subsidization must
,lic be wisely administered. (The recent establishment of an automobile as-
ere sembly plant in Recife gives the optimist pause on that score.) However,
but the northeast's indirect subsidization of the south at the price of the
nd neglect of its agriculture and the loss of its sons—consequences of a
public policy that hit that largely rural area harder than any other—
has perhaps continued too long. In the northeast, even more than in the
on southeast, planning for industrial development should aim above all for
1e- greater nonfarm employment, and should probably give full considera-
•iii- tion to the agricultural resources—particularly in the form of a high
•cts potential productivity in raw materials—with which the region is en-
by dowed. A balanced industrial-development program will also require
: tite much additional public investment in the northeast's agricultural agen-
we cies (especially those concerned with research) as well as in primary
education and public health.
ak-
A Concluding Parable
the Although the northeast's Golden Age in the preindustrial era came to
tnd naught, São Paulo and the southeast have clearly entered their own
•as Golden Age of self-sustaining economic development. It seems not un-
ce. reasonable to expect that they can expand this prosperity to encompassT
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fully the rest of Brazil. As Brazil continues to enlist the economic assist-
ance of the more advanced nations in this endeavor, it would appear
quite appropriate for these other nations to insist, as a quid pro quo,
that Brazil's richer regions lend a helping hand to the poorer. The
paulista of today, aware of his undisputed energy and present economic
superiority, has a tendency toward excessive provinciality and egocen-
tricity. These attitudes are untrue to the pioneering tradition of the
paulistas, whose leading role in the exploration and settlement of an
entire nation could well be paralleled within the very different context
of current development.
Perhaps the paulista should reevaluate the appropriateness of his joke
that São Paulo is the locomotive pulling twenty freight cars—the other
states. Certainly this was accurate enough when that locomotive was
Coffee, and for a time it remained accurate even when a stronger loco-
motive (Industry) was added. Somewhere along the line, however, the
older locomotive was put on a siding where, though it was no longer
pulling anything, someone kept its steam up. Meanwhile, the newer
locomotive pulled faster than ever. The accelerated movement was due
in part to the excellence of the engineer (a paulista, of course) but, in
even greater part, to the fact that half of the cars (the north-northeast)
had been uncoupled and their contents removed and used to fuel the
Industrial locomotive—and, occasionally, the old Coffee locomotive as
well! When the paulista (with his southern neighbors close behind) be-
came aware of the rapidly increasing gap between his own train and the
abandoned cars at a standstill far to the rear, he was faced with a diffi-
cult choice. He could try to forget them, he could back up, or he could
look for a second locomotive and engineer for the stalled cars. While
debating the alternatives, he made a new discovery: Someone had added
a caboose (Agriculture) to each train, with the one on the rear train
much heavier and considerably more in need of new ball-bearings and
axle-grease. What should he do?
In our story, at least, the paulista found for the second train another
engineer and a locomotive of the Industrial type at least half as good as
his own, filled up the empty cars, and—substituting additional competent
engineers and pusher-locomotives of the Agricultural type for the drag
of the two cabooses—arrived at a wholly successful solution. Shouldn't
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Comment
e G. EDWARD SCHUH, PURDUE UNIVERSITY
n
Nicholls' paper is in four parts. In the first part he djscusses the repeated
booms and retrogressions that characterized the first four centuries of
Brazilian history. In the second part he turns to the rise of São Paulo
since the beginning of the twentieth century. In the third he examines
LS therole of industrial-urban development in transforming Brazilian agri-
• culture in the decade 1940—50, and in the fourth and final part he sur-
veys Brazilian agricultural development since 1950.
I have chosen to direct most of my attention to part three. Here we
find the heart of his analysis in what Nicholls has indicated is an original
piece of empirical research on the interrelationships between the indus-
n trial and agricultural sectors of the Brazilian economy.
Before turning to this, however, I would like to compliment Professor
Nicholls on an excellent job of integrating a great deal of empirical
is knowledge and background material into a fascinating story of the de-
-
velopmentof Brazil. Professor Nicholls is most knowledgeable on the
Brazilian agricultural sector. He has gained this knowledge through an
L- extensivestudy of the Brazilian literature as well as empirically, through
d his continuing research activities on the country. He approaches the
Ic wealth of empirical data at his fingertips with the aid of a broad analyti-
d cal framework that enables him to integrate and synthesize these data
in a most effective way. As a result, his work is full of fruitful insights.
d The first part of the paper treats the repeated booms and retrogres-
sions of the first four centuries of Brazil's history. Although they played
a major role in the shaping of modern-day Brazil, none of these periods
of strong economic activity were self-sustaining nor did they lead to self-
it sustaining development. The perplexing problem to the development
I economist,of course, is why?
t Nicholls speculates as to possible reasons for this. In part he feels that
the cycles themselves resulted in a speculative and exploitive spirit of
"getting what you can while the getting's good," with a perennial failure
to plow back even a small fraction of large current earnings into the
capital improvements and better techniques which might have preserved
the income base even within agriculture. In addition, he suggests as im-
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portant factors: (1) the static and routinized production system which
arose because of the dependence on slave labor, (2) an unwillingness of
to protect local industry with tariff walls, (3) an agrarian philosophy
that viewed industrial-urban life with contempt, and (4) the very strong
orientation of the Brazilian settlers to their European homeland—in
contrast to their North American counterparts. These factors were corn- TI
plicated by the outright prohibition of manufacturing by Portugal during
the colonial period and the effective prevention of industrial protection-
ism at a later date by the privileged trade position given to England. as
After this long series of booms and busts, however, one boom finally th
led to the development of an industrial-urban complex which appears
to have the potential for putting Brazil on the road to self-sustaining ye
growth and development. What is the explanation for this? Once again, of
the boom was of agricultural origin, and in its early phases it did not fa
seem to be greatly different from the previous cycles. Nicholls once te
again provides insights into the factors that made the difference.
He argues that the existence of vast virgin lands for continual exploi-
I to
tation of coffee, the transportation improvements that made these lands tu
accessible, and the more venturesome spirit of the paulistas and new
immigrant class were contributory factors lacking in the earlier cycles.
Perhaps of more importance, he suggests, was the recognition of the
validityof industrialization as a goal, a willingness to imitate the indus-
trial protectionist policies of the United States, and a series of fortuitous
events, such as the two world wars, that stimulated the development of
domestic industry. Industrial development was facilitate4 by policies
designed to siphon the surplus from the agricultural sector into indus-
trialization.
In a capsule, then, agriculture served as the base for Brazil's rapidly
growing industrial sector. For a long period this industrialization was
evolutionary, but in the last two decades it has been largely government
S
induced. It is highly concentrated in the state of São Paulo, and this high
C
concentration has led to large regional disparities in per capita income
levels, despite the fact that subsequent industrial-urban growth has been
spreading into other states.
In the next section of his paper Nicholls addresses himself to the
z9
problem of how this rather highly concentrated development can be
transmitted to the remainder of the country. This is the basis of part
three of his paper in which he examines the role of industrial-urban de-
velopment in transforming the agricultural sector.
At this point there is a significant shift in the investigative approach.
Whereas previously he had emphasized the role of agriculture in the de-
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h velopment of the industrial sector, the author now turns to a discussion
of how industrial-urban development affects agriculture.
y
g The Industrial-Urban Hypothesis
n
The analytical framework that Nicholls uses in this part of his paper is
based on the conception of Dr. Schultz, as expounded in his book, The
Economic Organization of Agriculture.1 Schultz was concerned with two
aspects of the agricultural development of an already mature economy,
that of the United States. The first of these was the tendency for agri-
rs culture to experience secular low-income problems as the country de-
ig veloped. This he explained on the basis of (a) the low-income elasticity
of demand for farm products, (b) labor-saving technological change in
• farm production as elsewhere in the economy, (c) farm-product-saving
technological changes in the marketing and consumption sectors, and
(d) the high fertility rate of farm relative to nonfarm people. These fac-
i- tors require a continual adjustment of the labor force out of the agricul-
Is tural sector, and the mechanism by which this is accomplished in a
w market economy is through low relative incomes for farm people.
S. The secondaspectofagriculturaldevelopmentthatconcerned
Schultz was the spatial difference in labor incomes within the agricul-
S tural sector. Most obviously significant, of course, was the fact that the
IS poverty problems of U.S. agriculture had significant regional dimensions.
On investigation it turned out that the low income factor connected with
U.S. agriculture was concentrated in the South, and was not character-
s- istic of the agricultural sector as a whole.
1
To explain this Schultz developed a theory of spatial development
•y that has come to be known as the industrial-urban hypothesis. Briefly
summarized, this hypothesis is as follows:(a) economic growth in a
country occurs at different locations and at different times, (b) the cen-
ters of growth are primarily industrial-urban in composition, (c) the
• existing economic organization functions best at or near the center of a
particular matrix of economic development and also in those agricultural
he zones situated favorably in relation to such a matrix.
'be Thus, the income level of agriculture in a community which experi-
•Lrt encesindustrial-urban growth can be expected to increase relative to
.e- that in a community which does not experience such growth. Moreover,
• because of a spatial adjustment lag, the closer a community is to an
••h. 1TheodoreW. Schultz, TheEconomic Organization ofAgriculture, New York,
e- 1953.T
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industrial-urban center, the higher would be the income level of agri-
culture in the community.
Schultz goes on to argue that there are three factors accompanying
industrial growth which create regional income disparities:
(1) An increase in the proportion of the population engaged in pro-
ductive work.
e (2) An increase in the productivity of the labor force, from such
factors as increased investments in education.
(3) A reduction in the impediments to factor-price equalization, or
a reduction in the imperfections in the factor and product markets faced
by agriculture.
This hypothesis has been tested in the United States economy by
Ruttan,2 Nicholls,3 Tang,4 Sisler,5 Bachmura,6 Sinclair,7 and Bryant.8
The results of these studies have not been uniformly favorable to the
hypothesis, and as a result the theory has been refined and extended to
a more general framework. ti
The results, in brief form, are as follows: Ruttan, Nicholls, and Tang, t
each of them working with the Southeastern United States, found the
data to be consistent with the hypothesis. Bachmura obtained similar r
results for the lower Mississippi Valley, as did Sinclair for the South as
a whole. Sisler and Bryant, extended the analysis to include the total c
United States and found the hypothesis to be lacking. Sisler found that
the hypothesis was borne out by the data from east of the Mississippi,
but not by the data from west of the Mississippi. Bryant, using a larger
analytical frame of reference and a different set of data, obtained results
similar to those of Sisler. He found that east of the Mississippi River, the
closer a county is to an industrial complex and the larger the complex,
the higher are the earnings of farmers. However, the reverse is true in the
2V.W. Ruttan, "The Impact of Urban-Industrial Development on Agriculture
in the Tennessee Valley and the Southeast," Journal of Farm Economics 37:38—
56, February 1955.
WilliamFL.Nicholls,"Industrialization, Factor Markets, and Agricultural
Development," Journal 0/PoliticalEconomy 69:319—340, August 1961.
A. M. Tang, Economic Development in South Piedmont, 1860—1950, Chapel
Hill, 1958.
D. G. Sisler, "Regional Differences in the Impact of Urban-Industrial De-
velopment on Farm and Nonfarm Income," Journal of Farm Econo,nics 41:1100-
13, December 1959.
6FrankT. Bachmura, "Migration and Factor Adjustment in Lower Mississippi
Valley Agriculture:1940—50," Journal of Far,n Economics 38:1024—42, No-
vember 1956.
Lewis S. Sinclair, "Urbanization and the Incomes of Farm and Nonfarm
Families in the South," Journal of Farm Economics 39:510—516, May 1957.
W. Keith Bryant,Causes of Inter-County Variations in Farmers' Earnings,"
Journal of Farm Econo,nics 48:557—577, August 1966.r
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divisions west of the Mississippi. Hence, the hypothesis not only failed
for the western part of the United States, but a relationship was found
Lng which operated in the opposite direction to that postulated.
In understanding the Schultz analytic method and Nicholls' applica-
ro- lion of it, it is important to put them both in their proper frame of ref-
erence. Schultz was writing from the standpoint of a mature economy,
ch as most of us would define it, but an economy in which there were sub-
stantial regional income disparities within the agricultural sector, He was
or not concerned with the problem, currently receiving so much attention
in developing countries, of how agriculture can be made more productive
so that it can contribute to the industrial development of the country.
by Nicholls, in the present study, also examines the part of an economy
it.8 on its way to development; one in which a strong industrial sector is in
•the place, and in which wage rates are much higher than can be obtained
to in the agricultural sector. When this fortunate situation exists, the ques-
tion arises, "How can the gains from industrial development be dis-
tributed on as wide a base as possible?" In the U.S. economy, the work
the of Nicholls and others has led us to argue that local economic develop-
lar ment programs should be tied to nearby growth centers. The important
as point to recognize is that under these circumstances the problems en-
•tal countered are quite different from those connected with the agriculture
of most of the underdeveloped world.
p1, Withthis as a background, I would like to consider three aspects of
ler the in part three of Nicholls' paper:
•its
hlie
The Direction of Causality
he The frame of reference of the analysis is such that causality flows from
ure industrialization, as a process exogenous to agriculture, to the agricul-
tural sector. Nicholls does admit, however, that the cause-effect relation-
ral ship between industrialization and the agricultural indexes in São Paulo
is not at all clear. I would agree. In fact, I would argue strongly for a
pel reverse direction of causality.
)e- The Tennessee Valley, where Nicholls successfully used the industrial-
urban hypothesis to show what was taking place, offered a set of condi-
• tions greatly different from those in the state of Paulo. In the Ten-
nessee Valley, the agriculture at the beginning of the study period was
largely stagnant. The process of industrialization was imposed from the
irm outside, and came largely as an exogenous shock to the system. Clearly
this had an impact on the agricultural sector, and the a priori evidence
on the direction of causality was rather clear.
3*
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The case of São Paulo is quite different, however. The state ranks
high in agricultural resources. The agricultural sector has been dynamic
and growing rapidly, with rather large increases in total factor produc-
tivity over time. Moreover, the evidence from numerous sources is that
agriculture contributed heavily to the development of the industrial corn-
plex of São Paulo. Not only did the government transfer substantial c
capital from agriculture to industry through an ingenious use of multiple
exchange rates and outright confiscation of exchange earnings, but agri-
cultural entrepreneurs also invested rather heavily in the industrial sector.
This was very important in the period covered by Nicholls' study. At
the present time, some seventeen years later, it is my impression that s
the net flow is still from agriculture to industry, although there may be
some areas of the state in which the direction is opposite. This makes
me question whether causality can be assumed to run in the direction e
that Nicholls has postulated.
The Role of Increased Efficiency in the Factor S
and Product Markets a
In their work on the Southeastern United States, both Tang and Nicholls
have stressed the third set of factors accompanying industrial growth
as originally stressed by Schultz—these can be summarized as follows:
that industrial growth reduces the imperfections in the factor and prod-
uct markets faced by agriculture and hence raises farm income per
worker. Nicholls has carried this over to his Brazil work and argues that
what is happening is a reduction in the imperfections in the markets.
Keith Bryanthas argued rather effectively that the role of imperfec-
tions has been overemphasized in these analyses. He demonstrates that
in the case of the United States many of the observed relationships can
be understood as a straight-out influx of capital from the industrial sector
and that no appeal need be made to the reduction of imperfections in
the markets. On the contrary, he argues, the evidence on a reduction in
market imperfections is simply not there.
In addition, he maintains that the effect of industrial-urban develop-
ment on agriculture is in large measure a question of agglomeration.
The literature on agglomeration emphasizes the effects of economies of
scale, localization economics, and urbanization economies on firms in
industrial-urban complexes. The counterparts in the agricultural case
are as follows:
W. Keith Bryant, "Industrial-Urbanization and the Spatial Distribution of
Income in Agriculture," Proceedings, Workshop on income Distribution Analysis,
North Carolina State University, June 1966..4 TheCase of Brazil 385
(1)The expansion of the nonf arm labor markets increases the
numbers and kinds of jobs available to prospective migrants. This speeds
up the migration process as the opportunity cost of labor rises and
thereby forces the reorganization of agriculture.
(2) A similar set of forces works in the credit market, with more
a creditat lower interest rates being made available to agriculture.
(3) The local demand for farm products grows as the urban popu-
lation expands. At some point the market is large enough so that local
agriculture can operate at a lower average cost—either because of
increased specialization or because of the realization of economies of
size.
e (4) With the agglomeration, more social-overhead capitalis pro-
vided.This means roads, which lower transportation costs, and improved
educational facilities, which increase labor mobility and raise labor
productivity.
•
I Theseare the same kinds of factors that turn up in Nicholls' discus-
sion. But it is important to recognize that they do not necessarily imply
a reduction in market imperfections.
•Is
h The Policy Implications
Nicholls' paper is somewhat disappointing in its failure to distill out the
policy implicationsof his findings. One is led by implication to believe
that industrialization may be important in transforming or modernizing
1 theagricultural sector. Yet I doubt very much whether this is the solution
in most underdeveloped countries. It seems to me that the development
in many cases has to start with the agricultural sector, where most of
it the resources are, and proceed to raise the productivity there so that
• the resources for industrialization become available.
To make the issue clear, I would pose the question: "Where should
we put the next $1 million of developmental resources for the north-
east of Brazil—in agricultural research and extension, or in industrializa-
tion?"
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